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Why do some students delay college enrollment? Does it matter? 
Yuxin Lin 
 
Over one third of students in the U.S. who started college in 2012 did not enroll in the fall 
immediately following their high school graduation. Despite the prevalence of delayed college 
enrollment, however, little is known about the reasons for the delay and the consequences for 
academic and labor markets outcomes. Conventional human capital theory suggests that formal 
education should precede work in order to maximize the period of benefiting from the returns of 
investment in education. As such, the reasons for students delaying their college enrollment are 
still unclear. Usually, it has been perceived either as an irrational behavior, or a constrained 
behavior caused by the imperfect market. The first chapter of this dissertation provides an 
overview of the studies that explain the phenomenon of delay, and I conclude that financial 
constraint is not the only explanation. Students might rationally adjust the timing of enrollment 
to maximize their welfare, based on their personal capabilities, preferences, and economic 
conditions. Factors such as behavioral bias and sociological constraints also influence students’ 
educational decisions.  
Based on the theoretical framework proposed in the first chapter, it is predominantly 
believed that college enrollment could be countercyclical, especially for students who are 
financially constrained. The second chapter takes advantage of a natural experiment and 
discovers one of the factors that causes college enrollment delay: the housing market boom. I use 
the Education Longitudinal Survey: 2002 and the Building Permit Survey to estimate the effect 
of local housing market booms on college enrollment timing. I find that an additional 100 
increase in the annual change of building permits leads to 0.24 percentage-point increase in 
enrollment delay for male high school graduates. However, the temporary delay in transition to 
 
 
college that is caused by a housing boom does not necessarily decrease the college enrollment 
rate eight years, but it makes returners less likely to enroll in four-year colleges. 
Using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997, the third chapter of 
this dissertation examines the characteristics and earnings trajectories of delayers and the effects 
of this choice on academic and labor market outcomes. Propensity score matching results show 
that delaying college enrollment decreases individuals’ likelihood of enrolling in college, and 
increases their tendency to enroll in two-year colleges if they return to school. The results also 
demonstrate that, consistent with the study’s descriptive results, the early earnings benefits that 
are experienced by delayers diminish after their mid-20s and turn to significant losses over time. 
Oaxaca decomposition results indicate that differences in student characteristics only explain one 
third of the pay gap between the two groups; 60% of the pay gap is explained by delayers’ 
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In the literature on college enrollment and college choice, a common assumption is that 
college-intending students begin postsecondary education in the fall after their high school 
graduation. However, according to the National Postsecondary Student Aid Study, 37% of 
undergraduate students in the 1992–93 academic year waited a year or more after high school 
graduation to attend college (Riccobono et al., 2001), as did a similar proportion of the 2011–12 
cohort (Wine, Bryan, & Siegel, 2013). Despite the prevalence of delayed college enrollment, 
researchers have paid relatively little attention to this phenomenon or its consequences.  
In recent years, educational counselors and universities have increasingly promoted the 
“gap year” model (Hoe, 2015). In fact, all eight Ivy League universities have encouraged 
admitted students to take a gap year to travel, work, or engage in other productive activities that 
may help to prepare them academically and developmentally for college. Some schools, 
including Princeton University, Tufts University, the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 
the New School, and Elon University, even provide financial aid for students who take a gap 
year. 
However, for students who have fewer resources or are not planning to attend selective 
institutions, a gap between high school graduation and college enrollment may mean something 
different. For the average student, given the rising cost of attending college, financial concerns 
heavily influence college enrollment behaviors. According to the Education Longitudinal Study 
of 2002, over half of the students who delayed college enrollment named financial concerns 
(30%) or a preference to work (25%) as reasons for doing so. Only 15% indicated that they took 
a gap year to pursue personal interests or take a break from their studies. Working instead of 
enrolling in college allows individuals to save for college, defer paying college tuition, and enjoy 
vii 
 
short-term consumption benefits (Kane, 1996). Some also believe that accumulating work 
experience before college may increase students’ competitiveness in the labor market after 
college (Dellas & Sakellaris, 2003), although the extent to which pre-college experience matters 
for post-college employment remains unclear. Other life circumstances and events, such as 
military service, sickness, marriage, pregnancy, or a death in the family, may also cause students 
to defer college enrollment (Bozick & DeLuca, 2005).  
A review of the literature suggests that college enrollment delay may lower students’ 
likelihood of completing college, thus implicitly depressing the supply of skilled labor. A fact 
that has been ignored by prior studies is that some students who intend to delay their enrollment 
may never return to school once they deviate from the traditional educational trajectory. Even if 
all delayers eventually enroll, they may be unable to gain the same financial returns that they 
could have done if they had attended college immediately. Therefore, it is crucial for 
policymakers to identify the reasons for delayed college enrollment, and its results, yet few 
studies have rigorously analyzed the reasons for delay, or compared the outcomes of students 
who do not enroll in college immediately after high school (whom I refer to in this paper as 
“delayers”) with those who do (whom I refer to as “on-time enrollees”).  
To address the gaps in the literature, this dissertation attempts to examine the reasons for 
not attending college on-time, and its consequences. Chapter 1 systematically reviews the 
research related to delayed enrollment, and provides descriptive evidence of the reasons for the 
delay. Although conventional human capital theory suggests that formal education should 
precede work in order to maximize students’ period of benefiting from higher education, a 
significant portion of high school graduates still choose to postpone college enrollment. This 
chapter concludes that financial constraint is not the only explanation for the delay. Students 
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might rationally adjust the timing of enrollment to maximize their welfare, based on their 
personal capabilities, preferences, and economic conditions. However, behavioral bias and 
sociological constraints may impede students’ rational decisions and also lead to delay.  
Chapter 2 examines housing booms as a possible cause of college enrollment delay, and 
investigates their influence on students’ educational outcomes. Human capital theory suggests 
that college enrollment could be countercyclical, especially for students who are financially 
constrained. In this chapter, I exploit the natural experiment and discover the effect of local 
housing market booms on college enrollment timing. I examine the change in the number of 
county-level building permits, and argue that the occurrence of housing booms in some areas and 
not others is plausibly exogenous to latent confounders, such as innate ability or motivation, and 
leads to more frequent college enrollment delay. The results demonstrate that an additional 100 
increase in the annual change of building permits leads to a to 0.24 percentage-point increase in 
enrollment delay for male high school graduates. However, this paper also finds that a temporary 
delay in transition to college that is caused by a housing boom does not necessarily decrease the 
eight-year college enrollment rate. Instead, college choice is affected by enrollment timing; 
delayers are more likely to choose two-year colleges if they re-enroll. Delay also leads to a lower 
completion rate in four-year colleges. 
In Chapter 3, using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997, Vivian 
Liu and I examine the earnings trajectories of the delayers and the effects of delaying college on 
academic and labor market outcomes. Propensity score matching results confirm the conclusion 
from Chapter 2 that delaying college enrollment decreases individuals’ likelihood of enrolling in 
four-year colleges and increases their tendency to enroll in two-year colleges. Consistent with the 
descriptive results, the propensity score matching estimates demonstrate that the earnings 
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benefits that are experienced by delayers quickly diminish after their mid-20s and become 
significant losses over time. To investigate the key determinants of the wage differentials 
between on-time enrollees and delayers, we also exploit Oaxaca decomposition and find that 
differences in student characteristics only explain one third of the pay gap between the two 
groups; 60% of the pay gap is explained by delayers’ reduced likelihood of attending and 
obtaining a degree at a four-year college. 
This dissertation makes several contributions to the literature. Firstly, while most 
previous literature analyzes the consequences of enrollment delay for delayers who re-enroll in 
college eventually, my study is the first to attempt to answer the question of ‘does delay only 
change the sequence of college and work, or does it make some students abandon higher 
education permanently?’ Secondly, my analysis provides causal evidence for the effect of delay 
on academic and labor market outcomes. Although many other papers have considered the 
phenomenon that delayers tend to enroll in two-year colleges and earn less after graduation, their 
conclusion is often based on correlation analysis rather than causal inference. Thirdly, by using 
longitudinal data, I investigate the long-term consequences of delayed enrollment.
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Chapter 1. Delayed college enrollment in the U.S.: Why do students deviate from the 
typical education trajectory? 
1.1 Introduction 
College enrollment in the U.S. has been expanding for decades. The postsecondary 
education attendance rate for high school graduates increased from 45.1% in 1960 to 68.4% in 
2015 (Snyder et al., 2016a). However, less attention has been given to the timing of initial 
enrollment. There is an increasing amount of attention to later degree attaining  (Bound et al., 
2010; Turner, 2007), though scholars have not explore the connection between delayed 
enrollment and later degree attainment.  
According to National Postsecondary Student Aid Study (NPSAS), among undergraduate 
students who enrolled in postsecondary education in the academic year 2011-2012, 38% of 
undergraduate enrollees did not enter college in the fall of the year they completed high school. 
Although not explicitly measuring delayed enrollment, the share of undergraduate students aged 
above 25 is partially attributable to delayed college enrollment after graduating from high school. 
Nontraditional students who were older than 25 have accounted for a significant part of enrollees 
since 1993. About 36% of all undergraduate enrollees in any type of postsecondary institution 
were over age 25 in 1993. Even though the ratio has been diminishing for years, nontraditional 
students still accounts for over 30% of the total undergraduate enrollment in recent years. 
(Snyder et al., 2016a).  
Lacking previous research in this topic, the reason for this phenomenon is under-
investigated. But given the continuous rise in tuition over the past decades, one would naturally 
consider that the postponement in college enrollment is primarily due to financial constraints 
rather than a result of rational decision making under a perfect credit market. Economic concerns 
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cannot fully explain the phenomenon. Horn et al. (2005) indicate that postponement is a 
universal behavior across all income levels. Even some students among the top income quartile 
whose decision should not be subjected to financial constraints also delay attending college. 
Bozick and DeLuca (2005) suggest non-pecuniary factors, such as social/cultural contexts, life 
shocks, and military service, can compel students to defer college enrollment. Nevertheless, most 
of the previous research lacks a comprehensive description of the mechanism through which 
students choose to delay college enrollment. Few have applied causal methods to examine the 
reason for enrollment delay. 
The postponement between high school and college has been largely overlooked by 
policymakers.  Previous studies suggest that college enrollment delay may lower the likelihood 
of completing college (Bozick & DeLuca, 2005; Horn et al., 2005; Niu and Tienda, 2013) thus 
implicitly depressing the supply of skilled labor. Some intended delayers may never return to 
school once they deviate from the traditional trajectory. Therefore, it is crucial for policymakers 
to identify the reasons for delayed college enrollment. To address the gaps in the literature, this 
chapter systematically reviews the research related to delayed enrollment from both theoretical 
and empirical perspectives. The rest of this chapter is organized as follows:  In Section 2, I 
describe the extent of undergraduate delayed enrollment in past decades in the U.S. Section 3 
introduces the theoretical framework of the college entry timing and predicts the factors that 
could influence late enrollment decision. Section 4 overviews the empirical literature on delayed 
enrollment. Section 5 concludes and provides policy recommendations.  
1.2 Delayed Undergraduate Enrollment in the U.S. 
 Contrary to the common view, enrolling in college immediately after graduating from 
high school is not such a convention in the real world. Delayed enrollment is a widespread 
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phenomenon.  To explore the extent of delayed college enrollment, I first use the National 
Postsecondary Student Aid Study (NPSAS) for the analysis. NPSAS is a large, nationally 
representative sample of students in postsecondary institutions. It is based on a sample of all 
students in Title IV eligible postsecondary institutions throughout the U.S. during the surveyed 
academic year. As Figure 1.1 depicts, except for the 2007-2008 cohort, delayed enrollment 
accounted for over 30% of the total undergraduate enrollment1. It is important to note that the 
proportion of delayed enrollees in cohort of 07-08 decreased, and coincided with the onset of the 
Great Recession. I, therefore, hypothesize that students tend to invest higher education sooner 
                                                 
1 The delay flag in NPSAS is defined by whether the gap between students’ high school graduation year and initial 
postsecondary enrollment year is larger than zero. However, this definition assumes that high school graduation 
takes place in May or June, and college enrollment takes place in September of the same calendar year. This 
imputation would mistakenly deem students as delayers if they graduated in December and enrolled in college in the 
next spring. So, the delayed indicator in NPSAS may overestimate the proportion of delayers. In addition, I exclude 
respondents who have no information of high school graduation year and college enrollment year for consistency. 
Figure 1.1 Proportion of Undergraduate Delayed Enrollment 
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when employment opportunities became limited, leading to a higher ratio of undergraduate 
students entered college on-time. I will examine this hypothesis later in Chapter 2. 
Alternatively, the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) reports nation-wide 
nontraditional enrollees whose age is older than 25 every other year. Though not precisely 
measuring delayed enrollment, the share of older students is partially attributable to the 
proportion of delayed enrollment2. Figure 1.2 plots the percentage of older students by institution 
type since 1993. Even the ratio has been decreasing for years, nontraditional students still 
account for over one-third of the total undergraduate enrollment. Notably, the trend rebounded 
around the year 2007, which corresponded to the housing market crash and the beginning of the 
recession. This trend implicitly confirms the influence of local labor market on college 
                                                 
2 Nontraditional enrollment is unable to precisely reflect the delay entrance because it does not differentiate the 
sources of older enrollments. Enrollment aged above 25 could be a result of late high school completion, college 
incompletion, second degree pursuit, or interrupted college attendance. It also excludes short-term delayers who 
entered college 1 or 2 years later after high school graduation because their age is still below 25. 
Figure 1.2 Proportion of Enrollment Aged 25 and above  
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enrollment timing – not only high school graduates enrolled in college on-time, but also a higher 
ratio of adults returned to school after the economy collapsed. Two-year colleges have more 
nontraditional students– over 40% of the enrollees are aged 25 and above. Nevertheless, the 
uptrend of nontraditional enrollments in 2007 was mainly driven four-year universities, whose 
nontraditional enrollment rate climbed steeply after the recession. This trend suggests that 
delaying enrollment is no longer an isolated phenomenon for people returning to school for two-
year/part-time vocational training. When the Recession hit, four-year universities experienced an 
increasing number of adult enrollments, who were not a large part of their typical student 
population decades ago.  
Neither of above two measures can accurately reflect the enrollment delay, as the 
definition of delay heavily relies on knowing students’ plans. The share of delayed enrollees and 
nontraditional students only capture the delayers who successfully returned to college. However, 
when high school graduates decided to delay, some of them may never re-enroll. The nature of 
the delay makes it become extremely difficult to define the enrollment delay. Without knowing 
students’ intention of re-enrollment, another alternative data point that could reflect college 
enrollment delay is the rate of immediate transition to college. Among the students who did not 
enroll in any postsecondary institutions immediately after high school, some proportion of them 
intended to re-enroll in the future. Compared to the share of delayed enrollees and nontraditional 
students other two measures, the immediate transition rate accurately measures student’s college 
intention unconditional on student’s educational outcomes, which are also affected by the delay, 
though it unnecessarily includes the students having no college intention. Thus, in the rest of the 
paper, the immediate transition rate is my preferred measurement of delay. Figure 1.3 shows that 
almost 30% of high school graduates defer their postsecondary education trajectory. It is not 
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surprising that the immediate enrollment rate declined around 2004 and rose during the recession 
period, since high school completers tended to enroll immediately when the market is suppressed. 
The trend is especially obvious for two-year colleges, probably because the most vulnerable to 
the labor market shock are those on the margin of attending college. When the economy 
flourished, more students delayed four-year colleges, while more students enrolled immediately 
in two-year colleges when the housing market fell. 
NPSAS also contains information on the length of delay. Figure 1.4 illustrates the 
distributions of the duration of delay for the six cohorts from 1993 to 2012. One significant trend 
is that short-term delay became more common, mostly in the one-year range, while the 
proportion of longer delay dropped rapidly after 2000. The length of delay might reflect different 
reasons and motivations to delay and return. For instance, long-term delayers may never expect 
to return to college when they completed high school. The postsecondary education is more like 
Figure 1.3 Percentage of recent high school completers who were enrolled in 2- or 4-
year colleges immediately after high school completion, by level of institution: 1990–
2015 
 

































































an on-the-job training instead of a formal education for them. As a comparison, short-term 
delayers may deem delay as a rest during the transition. Gap years would not change their initial 
college choice. Thus, knowing the characteristics and the consequences of short-term and long-
term delay becomes another significant topic. Chapter 3 will discuss these questions in detail. 
Given the extent of delayed enrollment, the question remains – what makes students decide to 
postpone their postsecondary education? The next section will attempt to answer this question 
conceptually. 
1.3 Theoretical Framework 
1.3.1 Theory of Human Capital Investment 
 Under the traditional model of human capital investment developed by Mincer (1958) 
and Becker (1962), the decision to defer college entry is based on the marginal benefit and the 
marginal cost of doing so. Kane (1996) models college enrollment decision to demonstrate that 
deferring college entry is not a rational decision under a perfect market as the present value of 
Figure 1.4 Distribution of the Length of Delay 
 




















college payoffs is always larger than the present value of costs. Nevertheless, the assumptions of 
this model may not hold. In Kane’s model, wages for high school graduate and bachelor degree 
holders are constant over time, therefore, the opportunity cost and the return to higher education 
is presumed to be time-invariant. In fact, wages increase during economic expansion and 
stagnate in recessions. Considering the fluctuations in opportunity cost, a student might 
strategically adjust their education plans in response to local labor market change, especially for 
those who lack information about the payoff to college (Bettinger et al., 2012), or face credit 
constraints that force them to put a high value on current income (Lochner & Monge-Naranjo, 
2011). 
Dellas and Sakellaris (2003)’s model of the cyclicality of schooling fills the gap of 
literature by pointing out that opportunity cost consideration makes schooling countercyclical. 
More importantly, the authors see work experience achieved outside schooling as on the job 
training, which increases human capital accumulation too. By adding time-variant costs of higher 
education and human capital developed by post high school working experience, Dellas and 
Sakellaris (2003) conclude that  the propensity to enroll in college is negatively related to the 
current wage of unskilled labor, the real interest rate, and the direct cost of education, while 
positively related to the expected future wages of college graduates. Hence, people are more 
inclined to invest in educational activities when current wages are lower relative to future wages, 
which lowers the opportunity cost of enrolling school. Going to school is a safe port for students 
in an economic recession storm.  
But what has been overlooked by both Kane and Dellas and Sakellaris is that the cost of 
obtaining human capital might be heterogeneous to students. Based on Ben-Porath (1967), the 
production function of human capital is determined by variety of factors, including innate or 
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acquired abilities, the quality of co-operating inputs, and the constraints and opportunities 
offered by the institutional side. The time students devote to schoolwork may produce the 
diminishing marginal amount of human capital (Scott-Clayton, 2012). Therefore, continuing 
postsecondary education without breaks might not be optimal for all students in all situations. 
For example, for some students who were not yet prepared for college-level study and lack 
academic skills, immediate enrollment is costly in terms of time endowment. Students will 
balance the marginal benefit of delaying college against the marginal cost to their academic 
performance and progress. Individuals with greater academic preparation and achievement are 
more likely to enroll in postsecondary education immediately because they have a higher 
possibility to obtain admissions, and to successfully complete the educational program and 
realize earnings premium; students with greater personal financial resources are more likely to 
enroll in postsecondary education immediately because they have fewer financial constraints. 
In conclusion, individuals might respond strategically to the change in the labor market 
by choosing to enroll in college when demand for skilled employment is higher or wages for 
unskilled employment are lower. The wage for high school graduate 𝑤଴ is positively related to 
the propensity of delaying college enrollment, while the wage for a college graduate 𝑤ଵ is 
negatively related to the tendency of delaying enrollment. In addition, a higher discount rate 
imposes a higher cost for borrowing, leading students reluctant to borrow and more willing to 
work for income. Student ability is negatively associated with delayed enrollment – an 
academically disadvantaged student may find less benefit in immediate enrollment because he or 
she needs more years to complete college and obtain college wage premium. According to the 




1.3.2 Behavioral Economic Model 
Economic theories treat individuals as rational ones. But sometimes, people do not see 
education as an investment or use a rational, forward-looking sight to maximize lifetime welfare 
given various resource constraints. In the real world, people may not think in the long-term, and 
instead rely on rules of thumb of past habits, which usually lead to subprime outcomes. The 
behavioral economics that integrates the knowledge from psychology, neuroscience, and 
sociology can help us better understand individual decision making on enrollment timing.  
Three key implications can be summarized from the behavioral economic model. First, 
some students focus too much on the present (Lavecchia et al., 2014). Young people are 
especially prone to the short-term sighting. For example, Bettinger and Slonim (2007) find that 
more than 43% of children in their sample aged from 5 to 16 are impatient and have a high 
implicit discount rate via an artefactual field experiment which examines the intertemporal 
choices between varying levels and timings of compensation received. Particularly on the 
decision of college enrollment timing, present-biased behavior leads to over-emphasizing the 
cost of college relative to the potential future benefit, thus stimulating some students to defer 
higher education plans and choose to earn wages immediately after high school.  
Another implication of the behavioral economics is debt-aversion. As tuition has 
increased and federal grants have declined, loans have become the prominent form of student 
funding for postsecondary education (Long, 2008). Under a perfect market, although all students 
are free to borrow for college expense, not all students will choose to do so. Some students may 
overemphasize the risk by discounting future gain more than future losses. Long and Riley (2007) 
find the students of color tend to borrow a smaller amount on average. Perna (2008) surveyed 
students from 15 schools on their perception and willingness to take on student loans. The result 
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suggests that students at low-resource schools are “generally reluctant to borrow, question 
whether the benefits of borrowing exceed the costs, and worry about the need to repay loans” (p. 
601). As such, without enough savings and financial aids, risk-averse students may not choose to 
enroll in college immediately in order to smooth the current and future consumption. 
Second, some students stay with routine more than others (Lavecchia et al., 2014). 
Routines could be problematic when students are in a transition period, which needs to break 
daily routines. The research on “summer melt” – a phenomenon that “college-intending high 
school graduates fail to matriculate anywhere in college in the year following high school” 
(Castleman & Page, 2015, p. 145) – explicitly explains how relying on routines affects students’ 
college trajectory. Castleman and Page (2014) find that low-income students who have been 
accepted to college and signaled their intent to enroll have a disproportionately higher attrition 
rate in the summer after high school graduation because they failed to finalize tasks associated 
with matriculation. After admission, there are a number of complex financial, procedural, and 
logistical tasks during the summer such as paying deposit, completing Federal Application for 
Financial Student Aid (FAFSA), and dormitory application (Castleman & Page, 2014). Despite 
these many requirements, the summer between high school and college is a nudge-free time, 
especially for low-income students, who no longer have access to high school counselors and 
may be unfamiliar with support resources available at their intended college (Castleman & Page, 
2015). Their experimental study shows that creating “nudges” (by sending reminders of the key 
tasks they need to complete via text messages) helps students maintain focus and manage their 
time throughout the college planning process.  
Third, insufficient information or complexity may set barriers to on-time enrollment 
(Lavecchia et al., 2014). For decades, researchers have found that students and parents are not 
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fully aware of education costs, benefits, and options. A report from the Advisory Committee on 
Student Financial Assistance (2005) documents that students, parents, and adult learners are 
often intimidated by news stories about skyrocketing college cost of the most selective colleges, 
and have the impression that college is unaffordable. Avery and Kane (2004) demonstrate that 
low-income high school students especially have very little information about actual college 
tuition levels, financial aid opportunities, and the application process. While a low level of 
awareness can lead to suboptimal outcomes, complexity in terms of the application process can 
also be a source of informational barriers. For example, to receive Pell Grant or work-study 
funds, students need to complete the Federal Application for Financial Student Aid (FAFSA), 
which has been criticized for its length and complexity. Among students who did not complete 
FAFSA, more than 20% of them would have been eligible for Pell Grant (King, 2004). Faced 
with the time and cognitive burdens associated with college and financial aid applications, 
students may delay addressing or abandon a key step in the admissions process, particularly if 
students have preference for other activities in the present (Beshears et al., 2006; Castleman & 
Page, 2015; Madrian & Shea, 2000; Scott-Clayton, 2011). In two studies done by Castleman et al. 
(2012) and Castleman and Page (2015), misinformation is the another major reason for the 
summer melt phenomenon. Due to a lack of college-educated family members or college 
counselors, low-income students cannot confront challenges to complete the tasks they need to 
do during the summer in order to be prepared to start college on time.  
Compared to the human capital model, the behavioral model emphasizes how 
disadvantaged background sets barriers to on-time enrollment - through misinformation, 
hyperbolic discount rate, and procrastination. Compared to the discount rate, the behavioral 
economic model considers that the implicit discount rate is more important for its effect on an 
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individual’s time-inconsistent preference. For this reason, a person with higher implicit discount 
rate will prefer work or other activities in the present, and be less likely to borrow for college in 
order to obtain higher future incomes. Like the behavioral economic theory, sociological theory 
believes low socioeconomics contributes to nontraditional enrollment. The following section will 
introduce the sociological model in detail.  
1.3.3 Sociological Model  
Individual’s action should be fully understood while considering the social or cultural 
contexts in which the action occurs. The educational decision is not universal but may vary 
across social groups. Hearn (1992) raised four sociological mechanisms through which students’ 
educational aspiration to traditional enrollment is obscured by their social or cultural background. 
First is an ascriptive influence – students choose nontraditional enrollment options because of 
pressures caused by traditionally ascribed social and cultural roles. For example, married women 
with or without children may face time constraints to attend colleges, so they have to delay 
college enrollment until time constraint is released. Similarly, those from certain minority 
backgrounds may face cultural constraints that impede college attending aspiration. The 
socioeconomic constraint is the second explanation for non-traditional enrollment patterns. 
Nontraditional enrollment is rooted in social-class socialization as well as financial concerns. A 
survey done by Hossler et al. (1999) shows that parental support is very important for students’ 
postsecondary decisions. Educated parents can offer more support and encouragement not only 
in finance but also in information collection and aspirations. The third hypothesis is that 
academic marginality sets barriers for students to obtain higher education. Students choose to 
deviate from traditional educational trajectory because their modest academic abilities and 
achievements in secondary school isolate them from the college-intending track and resources 
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(Goldrick-Rab & Han, 2011). An individual with higher level of academic abilities and 
achievements also receives greater encouragement for educational aspirations from “significant 
others”, such as parents, teachers, counselors, and peers (Hearn, 1984; Perna, 2006). Finally, 
students who choose a nontraditional enrollment are likely to end up with other nontraditional 
enrollment options. For example, a student who delayed higher education is very likely to enroll 
in part-time or non-degree-granting programs. Hearn concludes that certain students display 
consistent nontraditionality, which means certain individuals will be especially prone to 
nontraditional enrollment. 
Different from the behavioral model, the sociological model explains the effect of SES 
status by its influence on educational aspirations, cultural/social capitals, and academic 
marginality. In summary, no single model can explain the reasons and mechanisms of college 
enrollment delay alone. Some factors may influence the decision via different channels. In the 
next section, I will revisit the hypotheses by overviewing the empirical literature. I will discuss 
the extent to which these studies are consistent with each theoretical model or not. 
1.4 Overview of Empirical Evidence 
1.4.1 Previous Research 
Tuition is one of the primary determinants of college enrollment timing in the human 
capital model. Kane (1996) documents that delayed college entry happens more commonly in 
high-tuition states. Kane analyzes the college entry age by the state cohorts and concludes that it 
is primarily low-income students who are sensitive to tuition levels – a $1,000 increase in tuition 
is associated with a 10 percentage points decline in entry rates for blacks by age 18-19, 
compared to 3 percentage point for white youth. Because of the data limitation, Kane defines 
delayed enrollment as college entry between the ages of 20 and 23. However, as stated in the 
15 
 
previous section, older enrollment might not be completely attributable to delayers. Other 
nontraditional enrolling behaviors, such as late high school completion, second-degree pursuit, or 
interrupted college attendance could lead to the older age of entry.  
In addition, the local employment market helps to explain the difference in college 
enrollment patterns. Johnson (2013) uses the unemployment rate before students enrolled in 
college as a proxy of the opportunity cost of enrollment. Compared to the 7.9% unemployment 
rate for all students aged 18-20 in the sample, the unemployment rate for those who delayed 
college entry is 0.8 percentage points higher, suggesting that more delayers enrolled in college 
when the economy turned down and career opportunities were fewer. Both Ferrer and Menendez 
(2014) and Fortin and Ragued (2016) have the similar findings using a Canadian national survey 
of postsecondary graduates. Ferrer and Menendez (2014) find that one additional point increase 
in the unemployment rate at the time before high school graduation decreases two-year college 
enrollment delay by 24.9 percentage points and decreases four-year university enrollment delay 
by 8.5 percentage points. In addition, studies find men are more likely to delay college 
enrollment than women (Kane, 1996; Rowan-Kenyon, 2007), which is possibly explained by 
male’s advantage in low-skilled jobs, which are mostly occupied by high school graduates.  
Student ability also affects college enrollment timing. Horn et al. (2005) indicate that 
compared to traditional students, delayers completed more remedial math courses, less advanced 
math courses, and took lower academic intensity level curricula. Delayers usually have a lower 
class ranking, GPA, test score and SAT/ACT. This finding is consistent with the conclusion of 
Rowan-Kenyon (2007), whose research shows that immediate entrants have more than one-half 
higher standard deviation on math scores than delayed entrants. Goldrick-Rab and Han’s study 
16 
 
(2011) provides evidence that students who have taken more science courses are less likely to 
delay college. 
If facing a financial constraint, a student may not go to college even if the marginal 
benefit exceeds the marginal cost (Dellas & Sakellaris, 2003). Johnson (2013) finds that 
borrowing constraint is associated with delaying behaviors. Late enrollees are less likely to 
receive parent transfers, grants, and loans. If borrowing constraint is removed, immediate 
entrants would increase by one percentage point. Rowan-Kenyon (2007)’s study documents that 
24% of the students who delay enrollment have zero financial aid contacts in the 12th grade, 
which is 7 percentage points higher than the immediate enrollment group.  
In general, studies on the economic factors determining enrollment timing are consistent 
with human capital theory – students choose to enroll in college when demand for skilled 
employment is higher or the cost of attending college is lower. One limitation is the external 
validity that generalizes the result to the more current population. For example, Kane’s study 
(1996) is based on a sample of 18-19 years old in 1970-1988. In that time period, it was 
possible/rational to delay college entry to save for college because tuition was lower and college 
costs did not rise as quickly. But in recent decades, deferring college enrollment because of 
tuition would only make students face higher tuitions later, as tuition and fees have continued 
growing at a faster rate than the real income. During the 2014-2015 academic year, the average 
cost (tuition, fees, room and board rates charged for full-time undergraduate students) was 
$ 21,728, which is 2.1 times the price in 1984-1985 in real terms (Snyder et al., 2016b). Likewise, 
it is less likely that working to save for college rather than borrowing could cover tuition and 
fees in recent decades. From 1984-2015, real median household income in the U.S. only 
increased by 8%. Moreover, students who work significantly the year before entering college 
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will be penalized in the determination of the Expected Family Contribution (EFC), the amount 
that a family is estimated to be able to provide towards higher education expenses (Long, 2008). 
Consequently, working before college enrollment will decrease the amount and or imperil the 
possibility of receiving need-based financial aid, such as Pell Grants. Therefore, it is suspicious 
that working before college can really mitigate financial pressure nowadays. In addition, there 
are not so many studies employing experimental or quasi-experimental methods. Most of the 
studies focus on the correlations of student demographics and the delay, which cannot draw a 
causal conclusion.  
There is a great deal of attention to college enrollment timing in the field of behavioral 
economics. The research on summer melt exploits the two major behavioral factors (Castleman 
et al., 2012; Castleman & Page, 2014, 2015; Castleman et al., 2013) – procrastination and 
misinformation. Castleman et al. (2012) use an experimental study to investigate the effect of 
providing college counseling to low-income students during the summer. They randomly 
assigned students at high schools to receive counseling services on securing additional financial 
aid, completing necessary paperwork, and alleviating concerns about going to college. Results 
show that providing college counseling to low-income students during the summer improves 
both the rate and quality of college enrollment. In the other experiment implemented in 2012 in 
both Dallas and Massachusetts (Castleman & Page, 2015), students were randomly selected to 
receive an automated and personalized text messaging about required pre-matriculation tasks and 
to connect them to counselor-based support. The interventions substantially increased college 
enrollment among students who had less academic-year access to quality college counseling or 
information. Though summer melt only represents one type of delay, these studies provide 
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valuable causal evidence that behavioral problems lead some students to deviate from their initial 
college plan. 
Sociological factors also affect the timing of college entry. It is widely accepted that 
students delaying college enrollment come from families from the underrepresented racial group 
or with lower SES, for instance, lower parental education, and larger family size (Bozick & 
DeLuca, 2005; Hearn, 1992; Horn et al., 2005; Johnson, 2013; Rowan-Kenyon, 2007). Horn et al. 
(2005) particularly study how the student characteristics differ by the duration of delay and 
indicate that the short-term delayer is at a severer socioeconomic disadvantage than long-term 
delayers.  
Hearn (1992) indicates that one possible mechanism through which SES influences 
enrollment timing is by affecting educational aspirations. Johnson's study (2013) provides 
empirical evidence that the shock to a preference for schooling is the main contributor to delayed 
entry to college. Students face time constraints as well, such as marriage and parenthood. The 
role of spouse or parent alters the time use and financial resources distribution. As a result of 
early transition to adulthood, young adults being married or parents confront higher pressure in 
time allocation and financial resources (Bozick & DeLuca, 2005). Having a child and marrying 
prior to college increase the chance of college delay by 12.5% (Goldrick-Rab and Han, 2011). 
Compared to the normal entrants, delayers are significantly more likely to be financially 
independent under age 24, which is the typical age cut-off for independence (Horn et al. 2005).  
1.4.2 Evidence from the Education Longitudinal Survey 2002 
With the hypothesized factors listed above, in this section, I develop the descriptive 
analysis to explore the determinants of delayed enrollment using the Educational Longitudinal 
Survey (ELS) of 2002. The ELS:2002 is a national representative, longitudinal study of 10th 
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graders in 2002. The second follow-up was conducted in 2006, two years post the year of high 
school graduation. The sample includes 1,2203 students who postponed the college entry and 
returned within two years.  
The most straightforward way to measure the reasons for delaying enrollment is to ask 
delayed students, “What is the major reason making you delay the college enrollment?” The ELS 
required all the delayed students in the sample to provide reasons for delaying enrollment in the 
second follow-up survey.  
As Table 1.1 shows, in general, financial concern is an important factor influencing 
                                                 
3 All the sample sizes of ELS: 2002 are rounded to the nearest ten protect the confidentiality. 
 
Table 1.1 Main Reasons Delayed Continued Education  
 
Reason All Female Male White Black  Hispanic 
Financial Constraints 
      
Could not afford to go on to school 6.9% 7.4% 6.4% 5.6% 7.4% 8.5% 
Needed to earn money for school 8.7% 8.9% 8.8% 9.2% 8.3% 7.7% 
Did not receive enough financial aid 4.1% 4.2% 3.8% 3.0% 6.5% 3.8% 
Needed to help support family 7.2% 7.5% 6.2% 4.4% 11.1% 8.5% 
Academic Preparation 
      
Not accepted at desired school(s) 1.9% 1.8% 1.6% 1.1% 4.2% 1.7% 
To improve academic qualifications 2.1% 1.2% 3.3% 1.6% 4.2% 2.1% 
Only admitted on deferred basis 1.2% 0.5% 2.0% 1.4% 0.9% 0.4% 
Preferences 
      
Wanted to work 25.2% 20.6% 30.7% 25.7% 25.5% 29.9% 
Wanted to serve in military 5.2% 2.2% 8.2% 5.6% 3.7% 3.8% 
Wanted to travel/pursue interests 9.9% 9.9% 10.6% 11.6% 2.8% 9.4% 
Life Shocks 
      
Traumatic experience 2.6% 3.9% 1.5% 2.1% 4.6% 2.1% 
Personal health reasons 2.6% 3.5% 1.3% 3.0% 1.9% 2.1% 
Pregnancy/childcare/marriage  4.0% 7.4% 0.2% 5.6% 5.1% 3.0% 
Taking a break 4.9% 6.0% 3.7% 5.5% 8.3% 6.0% 
Undecided on major, career, or school 2.9% 3.3% 2.4% 4.1% 0.9% 3.4% 
Other specific reasons1 10.7% 11.9% 9.5% 10.4% 4.6% 7.3% 
Observations 1,220 600 550 570 220 230 
Note: 1. Other reasons including the educational aspiration factors like “feeling college is not for me”, 
academic preparation factors like “not mentally ready for college, family relocation reasons, and 




students’ decision to defer higher education. 6.9% of delayers said they could not afford to go on 
to school; 8.7% needed to earn money to pay for school; 4.1% had to delay because they did not 
receive enough financial aid. Academic disadvantage contributes another 4.0% in total, with the 
half failing to get desired offers and the other half waiting to improve academic qualifications for 
the future opportunity. The sociological factors are reflected here from the perspectives of 
military duty, health reasons, pursuing personal interests, deferred program, family issues, 
marriage/pregnancy/childcare, and taking a break. Although none of every single reason exceeds 
10%, in total they comprise over 50% of the motives driving students to delay. What is also 
notable is that the preference for work is more significant than others as a single factor. This 
option is relatively different from the financial constraints such as “could not afford”, “needed to 
earn money”, and “did not receive enough aid”. The motivations behind this reason can be 
multiple, such as aspirations, economic concerns (not necessarily constraints), and tastes.  
If we separate the sample by gender, men are more likely to delay because they want to 
work and serve in the military, while women are more likely to delay because of earlier 
adulthood transition (pregnancy/childcare/marriage). It is worth investigating why males are 
more likely to delay for the reason “wanted to work”.  One tentative explanation is that men are 
more sensitive to local labor market shocks because they have relatively more advantage in low-
skilled jobs for high school graduates, e.g. construction and mining workers. When there is a 
boom in demand for low-skilled workers, men are more likely to be lured to work after high 
school for the higher opportunity cost of attending college. I will examine this mechanism 
specifically in Chapter 2.  
The reasons for delay also vary by race. Compared to whites, blacks and Hispanics are 
more likely to delay due to financial constraints and less likely to pursue personal interests 
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during the gap years. Furthermore, black students face academic constraints slightly more than 
the other two groups. This finding is consistent with the sociological research that students from 
minority families are more likely to be constrained financially and sociologically in college 
attendance.  
In conclusion, from both previous studies and evidence from ELS:2002, enrollment 
timing has many contributors including economic concerns, sociological constraints, as well as 
behavioral reasons. Although enrollment timing is ultimately based on a comparison of the 
benefit and cost of enrolling, assessments of benefit and cost are shaped by both individual’s 
background and behavior, as well as social context. Sometimes, these factors take effect via 
multiple mechanisms, directly and indirectly. 
1.5  Summary and Policy Implication 
This chapter reviews the conceptual frameworks and empirical evidence to explain the 
phenomenon of delayed college enrollment. It concludes that enrollment delay cannot be 
explained solely by market failure or life shock as conventional human capital theory predicted. 
The tendency to delay varies by sociological contexts and individual’s habitus. Economic 
concerns, demographic characteristics reasons, and behavioral factors all contribute to the 
postponement. In general, higher costs (direct and indirect cost) and lower benefits of attending 
college increase students’ financial concern and the tendency of enrollment postponement. Some 
students may not take the optimal path because their behavior departs from economic rationality. 
Disadvantaged SES background creates social constraints for students to enroll on time. Last but 
not least, delayed enrollment extensively reflects the result of preferences to other activities, such 
as working, traveling, and taking breaks.  
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The primary implication we can learn from the previous literature is that college 
enrollment timing that departs from the human capital model’s prediction is sufficiently common 
to receive more attention. It might be very costly for policymakers to identify the entire 
population who have the intention to delay college enrollment because, at the moment of leaving 
schools, some high school graduates who choose not to attend college have no idea whether they 
want to return to school in the future. However, for those who have been accepted to college and 
signaled their intent to enroll but ultimately do not enroll, it is worthwhile to define the target 
population and mitigate unnecessary attrition. From Castleman and Page (2014)’s estimation, 10% 
to 40% of low-income students who have been admitted by postsecondary institutions do not 
persist on their initial plan. At least for this specific group of delayers, Castleman et al. (2012)’s 
research suggests that for low-income students, active college counseling and nudging text 
message during the summer after high school graduation leads to substantially higher rates of 
college enrollment in the following fall. 
Still, the consequences of delay are not discussed in this chapter. What has been ignored 
by prior studies is that some delayers may never return to school once they deviate from the 
educational trajectory. Even if all delayers eventually enroll, they may be unable to gain the 
same return as they could have gained when attending immediately. In addition, there is a gap in 
literature as to the causal effect of a specific factor on the possibility of delay, or to what extent, 
delay changes college choice/income? In the next two chapters, I will address the gap by 
providing causal evidence that, (1) changes to the opportunity cost of enrollment resulting from 
labor market shocks is a causal explanation for some students deferring college enrollment after 




Overall, enrollment timing is a field with little research attention. Chapter One addresses 
the gap via a comprehensive overview of the mechanisms through which students choose to 
delay college enrollment, as well as a summary of the previous empirical research that provides 
evidence for the determinants of college enrollment timing. However, more research is needed to 
draw a solid conclusion on the reasons and results of the enrollment delay. In the next two 
chapters, I will exploit natural experiments and propensity score matching to provide causal 




Chapter 2. Do temporary delays in the transition to college have long-term consequences? 
Evidence from housing market shocks 
2.1 Introduction 
As demonstrated in Chapter 1, one of the most pronounced patterns of the past decades is 
the relationship between college enrollment and the economy. It is widely believed that local 
economic shocks affect educational attainment countercyclically (Betts & McFarland, 1995; 
Black et al., 2005; Cascio & Narayan, 2015; Charles et al., 2015; Dellas & Sakellaris, 2003; 
Evans & Kim, 2006; Kane, 1994; Walstrum, 2014). However, the nature of economic shocks has 
meant that most previous studies have used census data to present macro-level information (state, 
city, commuting zone, etc.). They estimate the immediate educational response to labor market 
shocks, and arguably understate the possibility of long-term consequences. In addition, 
increasing evidence suggests that initial labor market conditions (e.g. graduating in a recession) 
can have long-term effects on earnings (Beaudry et al., 2016; Genda et al., 2012; Kahn, 2010; 
Oreopoulos et al., 2012; Schmieder & Von Wachter, 2010), but most of these papers explain the 
effect of macro-economic conditions through its influence on job placement rather than 
educational attainment. 
This chapter examines how college enrollment timing responded to one of the most 
substantial housing bubbles in U.S. history, in mid-2000. From 1997 to 2007, after a decade of 
stable increase, national housing prices rose by approximately 50% (Figure 2.1), substantially 
increasing the demand for low-skilled construction labor. I exploit this natural experiment to 
discover the college enrollment timing across areas with different housing boom sizes. In 
contrast to the papers that estimate education elasticities to the price booms and busts in housing 
markets (Charles et al., 2018; Charles et al., 2015), I use the annual change in the number of 
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building permits as a proxy for housing market shocks, arguing that the occurrence of the 
demand for low-skilled labors of construction in some areas and not others is plausibly 
exogenous of college enrollment delay. In comparison, the variation in housing prices also 
impact household wealth, which is endogenous to college enrollment decision. Thus, relying 
solely on housing prices may capture both the wealth effects on schooling among home-owning 
families and the substitute effects of changing labor market conditions on educational attainment 
among all peoples in a market. Using the change in building permits can isolate the boom effect 
on high school graduates from the effect on household wealth.  
The notion that underlies this empirical approach is that the opportunity cost of college is 
a consideration for potential delayers, especially those who lack information about the return on 
investment from college (Bettinger et al., 2012), and those who face credit constraints that force 
them to place a high value on current income. Construction labor demand shocks have favored 
the less-educated, particularly males without a college degree (Charles et al., 2015), thus 
Figure 2.1 House Price Index in the U.S., 1980-2016 
 
Data Source: Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) 
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increasing the opportunity cost of college. The sample used for analysis is the restricted-use 
version of the Education Longitudinal Survey: 2002 (ELS:2002), which is a nationally 
representative, longitudinal study of tenth graders in 2002, conducted by the National Center for 
Education Statistics (NCES). Since the sample only contains one cohort, this paper exploits 
variation across counties in the quantity of the annual building permit changes as exogenous 
variation, and investigates the enrollment behaviors of the students who reside in different 
counties.  
With a hypothesis that the local housing boom induced some high school graduates to 
delay their enrollment in college, this chapter also examines the long-term effect on student re-
enrollment and completion. Previous research has not reached a consensus on the consequences 
of enrollment delay. Some studies have argued that the possible existence of barriers sorts 
delayed enrollees into inferior tracks, e.g., two-year colleges or part-time programs (Bozick & 
DeLuca, 2005; Horn et al., 2005). Others have indicated that delay has a positive return by 
giving students more years to resolve the uncertainty of educational returns before entering 
college (Ferrer & Menendez, 2014; Fortin and Ragued, 2016). Moreover, due to data limitation, 
almost all previous studies have focused on delayers who eventually enrolled in college (college-
goers), which ignores the effect of delay on college re-enrollment. This chapter includes all high 
school graduates in the sample and provides additional causal evidence to the recent studies on 
the educational impacts of college enrollment delay.  
I identify a small but precise booming effect on college enrollment delay: an additional 
increase of 100 building permits leads to a 0.24 percentage point increase in enrollment delay for 
male high school graduates. Although a local housing boom temporarily lures more male 
students to delay their college education, students who do not enroll immediately return to 
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college within three years of high school graduation. By the end of the eighth year (2012), the 
booming effect has diminished to an insignificant 0.1 percentage points, meaning that there is no 
evidence to suggest that a local housing boom has a long-term effect on college enrollment. 
However, the estimation of college choice suggests that a housing boom makes returners less 
likely to enroll in four-year colleges and more likely to enroll in two-year colleges. The college 
completion rate eight years after graduating from high school is lower for the male delayers than 
the on-timers.  
This chapter makes several contributions to the literature. Firstly, it is the first study to 
attempt to provide a causal explanation for college enrollment delay. Secondly, it predicts the 
effect of the housing boom on the delayers who returned to college. Thirdly, by using 
longitudinal data, this study is able to examine long-term consequences and more detailed 
educational outcomes that cannot be determined by using the census data. 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a descriptive analysis 
of the extent of delayed undergraduate enrollment, and trends in the U.S. housing market in past 
few decades. Section 3 introduces the conceptual framework of the college entry timing, and 
predicts the factors that could influence enrollment decisions and their consequences. Sections 4 
and 5 outline the research design and data. Section 6 discusses findings, and Section 7 concludes 
the chapter.  
2.2 Descriptive Analysis 
College enrollment in the U.S. has been increasing for decades; the post-secondary 
education attendance rate for high school graduates increased from 45% in 1960 to 68% in 2015 
(Snyder et al., 2016). Meanwhile, students commonly delay their college enrollment after 
graduating from high school. To better understand the extent of delayed college enrollment and 
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how it responds to macroeconomic conditions, I present the immediate college transition rate 
over the past twenty years. Panel A in Figure 2.2 illustrates that almost 70% of high school 
graduates in recent few decades immediately continued their education in two-year or four-year 
colleges. The immediate enrollment rate declined in the era of the housing boom (1997-2001, 
2005-2006) and rose during the recession; this trend is particularly remarkable for two-year 
Figure 2.2 Percentage of Recent High School Completers Who Were 
Enrolled In 2- Or 4-Year Colleges Immediately After High School 
Completion, By the Level of Institution: 1990–2015 
 
Data Source: Digest of Education Statistics (1990-2015) 




colleges and males (Panel B). It implies that males at the margin of attending college are the 
most vulnerable population for labor market shocks.  
Using data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, Figure 2.3 shows overall employment in 
the construction sector, which apparently closely followed the price trend of the national housing 
market. From 1997 to 2007, total employment in the construction sector increased by more than 
30%, from 5.8 million to 7.6 million. When the housing market collapsed, it dropped to 5.5 
million in 2010. 
 
Panel A in Figure 2.4 depicts the fraction of total population employed in construction by 
gender and education groups. Clearly, employment in the construction sector was dominated by 
non-college males (aged 18 to 30), for whom the employment share in construction increased 
from 14% to 18% during the housing boom. For both education attainment levels, the share of 
women employed in the construction industry only accounted for a very small portion and 
Figure 2.3 Overall Construction Employments, 1990-2016 
 
Data Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics 
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changed little in the past few decades. More specifically, Panel B narrows the target population 
to those aged 18 to 20, which is mainly composed of high school graduates. Compared to 
females, young males were disproportionately overrepresented in the construction sector during 
the housing boom from 2001 to 2007. More notable still is the plummet of the share of young 
men after 2007, which suggests that male construction workers of college age were the most 
sensitive to the collapse of the housing market.  
 
Figure 2.4 Construction Employment Share of Total Population, 1990-2016 
 
Data Source: Current Population Survey 




Since variation in housing prices affects household wealth, high school graduates might 
be more likely to enroll in college immediately than to delay, as their household wealth increased 
during the boom. Thus, relying solely on housing prices may capture both the wealth effects on 
schooling among home-owning families and the substitute effects of changing labor market 
conditions on educational attainment among all peoples in a market. In order to measure the 
changing labor market clearly, I use the change of building permits on new privately-owned 
residential construction, as it represents discrete and acute demand shocks for the construction 
labor market. Figure 2.5 displays the total building permits in the U.S. between 1990 and 2016. 
In contrast to housing price and employment, the number of building permits reached a peak 
earlier than 2007. This is because no actual construction work can begin until a permit has been 
issued, thus the trend for building permits precedes the trend for the construction labor market. 
 
Panel A in Figure 2.6 demonstrates this lagged relationship more clearly by plotting the 
total employment in the construction sector and the number of building permits by years. Panel B 
Figure 2.5 Number of Building Permits, 1990-2016 
 
Data Source: Building Permit Survey, U.S. Census Bureau 
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presents the annual percentage of change in construction employment and building permits. Both 
panels demonstrate that an interval of approximately two years exists between the trends of 
building permits and construction employment. 
 





Data Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics and Building Permit Survey 
Note: Vertical reference lines indicate year 2001 and 2003, reflecting the two-year interval between 
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2.3 Conceptual Framework 
Under the traditional model of human capital investment developed by Mincer (1958) 
and Becker (1962), the decision to defer college entry is based on the marginal benefit and the 
marginal cost of college enrollment. The higher opportunity cost of attending post-secondary 
education makes high school graduates less likely to enroll immediately4. When base wages rise 
or there is a positive economic shock, students tend to shift toward entering the labor market 
sooner and working longer hours. However, this shift is small when the expected skilled wage is 
higher than the unskilled wage, or when returns on human capital are high. An increasing 
amount of literature has identified post-secondary enrollment to be countercyclical with respect 
to national economic trends (Betts & McFarland, 1995; Cascio & Narayan, 2015; Charles et al., 
2015; Dellas & Sakellaris, 2003; Evans & Kim, 2006; Walstrum, 2014). Occupations in 
construction are dominated by low-skilled workers according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
and thus housing booms may increase the employment opportunities for high school graduates. 
This notion points to a possible mechanism that links local housing markets to students’ college 
enrollment timing.  
As illustrated in Figure 2.6, the pattern of change in new building permits is roughly two 
years ahead of the pattern of change in employment in the construction sector. Considering that 
high school students often decide between their junior and senior years to attend college, I 
examine the change in the number of local permits for new houses three years prior to high 
school graduation as the exogenous shock to opportunity cost, and use it as an instrumental 
variable (IV) for college enrollment delay5. To explain the mechanism visually, Figure 2.7  
                                                 
4 The detailed theoretical model is presented in Appendix A. 
5 There are three reasons why I have selected annual change in the number of building permits rather than the 
percentage of change or the total number of building permits as a proxy of shocks to construction labor market. 




                                                                                                                                                             
percentage of change cannot be calculated. Second, the percentage of change might not precisely reflect the size of 
local market shocks. For example, if the number of building permits increases from 1 in 2000 to 2 in 2001, it is a 
highly significant shock in terms of the percentage of change, but as a source of demand shock to labor, it does not 
lead to a sizable fluctuation in the local labor market. In the sample, over 900 out of 3,000 counties experienced such 
a small shock to their local labor markets (the number of building permits varied within 10 units). Third, the total 
number of building permits alone cannot reflect local labor market shocks. For example, compared to a county that 
issued 50 permits 5 years ago but issues 10 more permits annually, a county that issued 100 permits each year 
steadily for the past 5 years may not have an increasing labor demand in the construction sector. In addition, the 
total number of permits is more likely to be determined by local demographics that are persistent for years, e.g., 
population, income level, area, urbanity, etc. Thus, the students who lived in counties with larger housing markets 
might be fundamentally different to their counterparts from the perspectives of local educational resources, 
motivation, and family background. 
Costs 
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Figure 2.7 Proposed Conceptual Model of College Enrollment 




proposes a conceptual model. Consider a student who allocates the timing of college education 
and work in year n. Within the perfect capital market, the optimization of the human capital 
investment function occurs when the marginal cost of attending college immediately is 
equivalent to the marginal benefit of doing so. Thus, the propensity to enroll in college is 
negatively related to the current wage of unskilled labor, represented by the condition of 
employment in the construction sector in year n-1, the year before high school graduation. In 
some regions, the variation in the demand for construction labor is larger because of a 
speculative bubble in the housing market. Therefore, I use change in permits in year n-3 as an 
indicator of the local housing market boom, as it can predict the employment condition in the 
construction sector two years in advance. In summary, the permit change in year n-3 serves as an 
instrument for delayed enrollment by the mechanism of changing opportunity cost. 
What does the theoretical framework tell us about the consequences of enrollment delay? 
One of the major concerns of policy implication is whether delayers could receive the same 
returns on a college education as those of immediate enrollees. As the human capital model 
predicts, students choose the timing of college enrollment in a countercyclical manner, adjusting 
the sequences of schooling and work to postpone the earnings trajectory. However, delayed 
enrollment can be harmful if it leads to a suboptimal result by lowering the return on education 
for delayers. For example, removed from their schooling cohort, delayers could be especially 
deficient in knowledge about college or financial aid, resulting in a higher possibility of 
attending schools with low quality or low completion rates, or of abandoning re-enrollment 
altogether. In addition, the education pursuits for delayers could be very different to those of 
immediate enrollees. Common pursuits for delayers are vocational training, preparation for 
promotion and changing job industries (Horn et al., 2005), for which two-year colleges and 
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short-term certificate programs are more suitable. More importantly, the intention to return to 
college might weaken as the length of the delay increases. We do not know whether there exists 
an age after which the motivation to return to college is so low so that almost no one will return 
to college. 
2.4 Empirical Strategy  
To test whether the building permit is an effective instrument for delayed enrollment, 
Figure 2.8 illustrates the correlation between male immediate college enrollment and a three-year 
lead of building permit changes from 1994 to 2015. A downward fitted line indicates the 
negative correlation between immediate enrollment and the local housing market. Overall, 
college enrollment timing is correlated with the construction labor market and housing market, 
Figure 2.8 U.S. Annual Change in the Number of Building Permits and Male 
Immediate College Enrollments, 1994-2005 
 
Data Source: Building Permit Survey and Digest of Education Statistics 
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and non-college young men play an important role in this effect. One of the potential limitations 
to my empirical strategy is the assumption that building permit changes can precisely capture 
low-skilled labor demand shock. To verify this assumption, I use females as a comparison group, 
who are likely to be affected less by shocks to the construction industry. If any other 
confounding factors exist, such as demand shocks for high-skilled labor, wealth effect caused by 
higher housing prices, or general economic trends, both males and females would be affected 
simultaneously. The other limitation is the assumption that labor market shocks can serve as an 
IV. The assumption of exclusion restriction can only be confirmed if building permit changes do 
not affect college enrollment outcomes directly or indirectly, but only via the effect on delayed 
enrollment that is conditional on all other covariates. For example, the IV would not be valid if 
students who lived in counties with larger labor market shocks were more likely to choose two-
year colleges not only because they delayed more often, but also because they wanted to 
graduate sooner in order to work. For these hypotheses, I run multiple subgroup regressions to 
investigate the mechanism of the effect. 
The previous studies on delayed enrollment have defined delayers as those who did not 
start college education immediately but returned to college after a period. The definition 
excludes a possibility that some students who had planned to enroll in college with a delay leave 
educational trajectory permanently. However, it is difficult to identify which student had the 
intention to return to higher education and which students decided not to enroll. I define delayers 
as all high school graduates of the ELS:2002 cohort who did not enroll in college immediately 
upon high school completion in 2004. Assuming that the non-compliers (those who never enroll) 
would not be affected by labor market shocks, this new definition can answer a more meaningful 
policy-related question: can students return to college if they do not enroll immediately? 
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For all high school graduates with valid geographical and college attendance information, 
I estimate how building permit changes influence enrollment timing in the short term by running 
an Ordinary Linear Regression (OLS) model only for males, who are considered to have an 
advantage in low-skilled construction jobs.  
𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑦௜௚ =  𝛼௜௚+𝛽௜௚∆𝐵𝑢𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔_𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡௚(ଶ଴଴ଵ) + 𝑋௜௚ + 𝜀௜௚  (1) 
The enrollment timing of individual 𝑖 who lived in county 𝑔 is determined by the annual 
change in the number of permits of county 𝑔 from 2000–2001, ∆𝐵𝑢𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔_𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡௚(ଶ଴଴ଵ), a 
vector of covariates, 𝑋௜௚, which includes individual demographic variables, e.g., race, socio-
economic status (SES) quartile, math ability, parental education, and county-level covariates, e.g., 
land area, population, urbanity index and unemployment rate. The dependent variable 𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑦௜௚ is 
equal to 1 when high school graduate 𝑖 has not attended college immediately after high school 
completion in 2004, regardless of his final enrollment decision by 2012. Robust standard errors 
are clustered at the county level.  
Next, if we accept the assumption that the housing boom that occurred in 2001 (year 𝑛 −
3) affects students’ educational outcomes after 2004 (year 𝑛) only through the enrollment timing 
in 2004 (year 𝑛), I can use the building permit changes as an instrument to estimate the local 
average treatment effect (LATE) of not enrolling immediately on students’ college enrollment 
eight years after high school graduation. By using equation (1) as the first stage, I employ a Two 
Stage Least Square (TSLS) strategy, with a second stage as follows:  
𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑒௜௚ = 𝜇௜௚ + 𝜋௚𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑦෣ ௜௚ + 𝑋௜௚ + 𝜖௜௚  (2), 
where 𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑒௜௚ is the college attendance dummy that indicates that student 𝑖 had 
attended at least one post-secondary institution by the end of the most recent follow-up survey in 
2012. For the analysis of the effect of not enrolling immediately on college choice, I apply the 
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same instrument variable to estimate the influence on four-year college enrollment and two-year 
college enrollment by 2012. TSLS analysis attempts to provide a causal estimation of (1) 
whether not enrolling immediately affects the possibility of college enrollment eight years after 
high school graduation, and (2) how students’ choice between two-year and four-year schools is 
influenced. I will also report the result for college completion, but the estimation could 
potentially be biased because some delayers might have started college and still been enrolled in 
2012. 
2.5 Data 
Two different datasets are used for the study. The first is the educational data, which 
contains information on college enrollment timing and geographical variables, and the second is 
the data for local building permits. These two datasets are merged for the county of residence 
where students attended high school.  
2.5.1 Education Data 
The primary data for this study is the restricted-use version of the Education Longitudinal 
Survey: 2002 (ELS:2002). ELS:2002 is a nationally representative, longitudinal study of tenth 
graders in 2002, conducted by the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) of the 
Institute of Education Sciences, U.S. Department of Education. The advantage of using 
ELS:2002 to analyze delayed enrollment is the rich information on geographical location, 
educational outcomes, and personal characteristics. In addition, the students who were in the 
tenth grade in 2002 faced the unprecedented housing boom when most of them graduated from 
high school in 2004. The base year survey contains a total of 16,200 students6. Three follow-up 
surveys were conducted in 2004, 2006, and 2012, respectively. By the third-round follow-up in 
2012, 15,150 students had obtained a high school diploma. Most of them completed high school 
                                                 
6 All the sample sizes of ELS: 2002 are rounded to the nearest ten protect the confidentiality. 
40 
 
in 2004 (90.3%). By the end of the third follow-up, 10,900 respondents had attended at least one 
post-secondary institution, while 1,740 had not. Students were asked to report the timing of their 
first post-secondary enrollment since the second follow-up in 2006. Delayed enrollees are 
defined as those who did not start their post-secondary education by October of their high school 
completion year (if they graduated from high school between January and July), or by the 
following February (if they graduated after July). Among all 16,200 respondents, around 15,500 
have valid geographical information (e.g., state, county, zip code, etc.). Their locations are 
spread among 740 counties. Using the information on students’ enrollment timing and detailed 
location, I can observe the college enrollment delay across different counties. 
One of the disadvantages of using ELS:2002 is that all individuals in ELS:2002 come 
from the same cohort (the class of 2004). The only variation in labor market shocks comes from 
geographical difference. In addition, although the sample is nationally representative, this 
particular cohort might not be generalized to the entire population of high school graduates, as 
they faced an unprecedented housing boom upon completion of high school, followed by an 
unprecedented recession three years later. Any enrollment pattern observed from the sample 
could be explained by the distinct economy that this cohort faced in their 20s.  
2.5.2 Building Permits 
Next, I use the data from the Building Permit Survey conducted by the U.S. Census 
Bureau for the permits of new buildings approved to be constructed in each county. This dataset 
covers all places that issue building permits for privately-owned residential structures. Over 98% 
of all privately-owned residential buildings constructed are in locations that issue permits. The 
variation in labor market shocks faced by the sample is reflected in the county-level variation in 
changes of building permits from 2000 to 2001, three years before the cohort in question 
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graduated from high school. The size of variation in local building permit changes might be 
correlated with county demographics; for example, a county with a larger population size has a 
higher demand for new houses. During the housing boom, a larger county may also have a more 
sizable demand shock to the construction market. To control for the local demographics, I 
supplement the main data sets with county-level covariates, including land area, population, 
urbanity index and the unemployment rate, which are obtained from the Inter-university 
Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR, 2008) of the University of Michigan.  
2.5.3 Summary Statistics 
Table 2.1 displays the summary statistics of the main variables for the students in the 
sample. I exclude the observations with no response for college enrollment or geographic 
information. For students who reported college enrollment information in 2006 (F2) but did not 
respond in 2012 (F3), I keep the observations with their responses in F27. On average, 33% of 
the sample did not enroll in college immediately. The mean duration of the enrollment gap is six 
years. Compared to female students, male students are more likely to delay, less likely to return, 
and wait longer to enroll in college. In 2001, there were an average of 115 building permit 
changes in the county where students lived in their senior year of high school. Figure 2.9 plots 
the distribution of the number of building permit changes. In most counties, the number of 
building permits increased or decreased within a range of 500 in 2001. However, a few counties, 
such as Maricopa County in Arizona, Clark County in Nevada, and Hillsborough County in 
Florida, issued over 4,000 more building permits than they had done in 2000. These counties 
were usually located in the states that experienced a larger housing “bubble” during the boom.  
 
                                                 
7 If a student contradictorily states that he/she has attended college in F2 but has not attended in F3, I recode his/her 




Table 2.1 Descriptive Statistics of ELS:2002 
Selected Student Characteristics 
Mean 
All Male Female 
Black 0.1530 0.1480 0.1578 
Hispanic 0.1372 0.1336 0.1407 
White 0.6552 0.6385 0.6715 
High school graduation in 2004 0.8613 0.8337 0.8883 
SES quartile (1=lowest) 2.5894 2.6134 2.5665 
Math ability quartile (1=lowest) 2.6087 2.6584 2.5614 
Parental education (1=receiving any postsecondary 
education) 
0.7490 0.7550 0.7433 
Ever applied postsecondary education 0.7964 0.7478 0.8437 
Married 0.2774 0.2365 0.3172 
Singer parent status 0.0294 0.0119 0.0465 
Delayed college enrollment1  0.3379 0.3735 0.3031 
Immediate college enrollment 0.6508 0.6034 0.6969 
Have ever attended postsecondary education by 
2012 0.8329 0.7807 0.8837 
Reenrolled by 2012 0.1825 0.1775 0.1873 
Never enrolled by 2012 0.1671 0.2193 0.1163 
Length of delay 6.1527 5.8386 6.4586 
Have attended four-year institutions 0.4530 0.4116 0.4932 
Have attended two-year institutions 0.2970 0.2828 0.3109 
Completing postsecondary education 0.3907 0.3398 0.4403 
Change in building permits (in hundreds) 1.1545 1.1895 1.1203 
Number of Observations 13,620  6,720  6,900  
Data Source: Education Longitudinal Survey: 2002 restricted-use data  
1. Delayed college enrollment is defined as not entering college in 2004. 




Figure 2.10 depicts the frequency of college attendance by years for students who did not enroll 
in college immediately. If delayers returned to campus, most of them chose to do so in the first 
two years; 25% enrolled in the first year and 9% enrolled in the second year. This rate drops 
below 5% in the third year, after which it remains at approximately 2%. A cumulative frequency 
curve shows that the final enrollment rate for delayers remains stable at 56%, suggesting that half 
of the delayers are still unenrolled. Given the subtle change in the re-enrollment rate after three 
years, eight years is a reasonable time frame in which to observe delayers who have returned to 
college.  
Figure 2.9 Distribution of Change in Number of Building Permits  
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In the second follow-up wave in 2006, the delayed students who returned to college were 
asked about the reasons for the postponement, which is one of the best ways to measure the 
reasons for delaying enrollment directly. As stated in Chapter 1 (Table 1.1), the most notable 
factor is the preference to work, with males being more likely to delay for the reason that they 
“wanted to work”. This pattern reflects the fact that men are more sensitive to local labor 
demand shocks because they are at a relative advantage in low-skilled jobs for high school 
graduates than women, e.g., construction workers. When there is a housing boom in demand of 
low-skilled workers, men are more likely to be attracted to work after high school due to the 
consideration of higher opportunity cost.  
2.6 Findings 
2.6.1 Booming Effects  
Figure 2.10 Frequency of College Attendance for Non-immediate-enrollees 
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Before discussing the result in numbers, I first visualize the correlation between building 
permit changes in 2001 and the proportion of non-immediate enrollment for males at the county 
level in Figure 2.11. Although most of the variation in permits is within 500 units, counties that 
experienced larger housing booms weigh more to the correlation. An upward fitted regression 
line suggests that a county with a larger increase in the permits issued in 2001 would have more 
male high school graduates who delayed their transition to college in 2004. 
To clarify the relationship, Table 2.2 presents an estimation for the effect of building permit 
changes on enrollment delay for males. The OLS results suggest that, on average, an additional 
100 increase in the annual change of building permits increase causes 0.24 percentage points 
more male high school graduates not to enroll in college immediately. In other words, one 
standard deviation increase in building permits will lead to a 0.17 standard deviation increase in 
college enrollment delay. Considering that four million students graduated from high school in 
Figure 2.11 Proportion of Male Delayers vs. Building Permit Changes at County-level 
 




2004, this increase means that an additional 5,000 male students might delay their college 
enrollment if the change of building permits increases by 100 for each county. 
 
If the influence of local housing market shocks is only through the pipeline of increasing 
unskilled employment opportunities in the construction sector, women are presumed to be less 
affected. As a robustness check, the results for the females are listed in Table 2.3. In contrast to 
the findings for males, living in a county with a larger increase in building permits has a very 
small and insignificant effect on enrollment delay for females. The result for females confirms 
Table 2.2 The Effect of Change in Number of Building Permits on College Enrollment 
Delay 
Dependent Variable: College Enrollment Delay1 
  (1) (2) 
Change in Number of Permits of New Housing 
Unit, 2001 (in hundreds)  0.0024***  0.0022** 
  (0.0009) (0.0009) 
Black  -0.0097  -0.0040 
  (0.0155) (0.0162) 
SES Quartile -0.1067*** -0.1082*** 
  (0.0066) (0.0066) 
Math Ability Quartile -0.1305*** -0.1314*** 
  (0.0055) (0.0055) 
Parental Education -0.0196  -0.0217 
  (0.0157) (0.0157) 
First-stage F-statistics 213.69 32.27 
R2 0.2106 0.2244 
County Level Covariates2 Y Y 
State Fixed Effects   Y 
N 6,420 6,420 
Data Source: Education Longitudinal Survey: 2002 restricted-use data 
1. Students who did not enroll in college by 2004 are defined as delayers. 
2. County Level Covariates include population size, unemployment rate, 
and urbanity index. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses     
* Statistically significant at the .1 level; ** at the .05 level; ***at the .01 
level. 
All sample sizes are rounded to the nearest ten. 
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the validity of using building permits as an instrument. As a proxy of demand shocks for low-
skilled labor in the construction sector, the change in building permits mainly influences 
opportunity cost for men, who have an advantage in labor-intensive industries. The lack of a 
significant effect on women’s enrollment timing suggests that building permit changes are not 
confounded by other factors, such as demand for high-skilled labor, housing wealth, or general 
economic trends that should affect both males and females simultaneously8. 
 
                                                 
8 The OLS and TSLS estimations for females are presented in Table B1. Since the first stage for females is 
insignificant and weak, it exaggerates the TSLS result and the standard error, weakening the statistical significance 
Table 2.3. First Stage for Female Delayed College Enrollment Using Change in the 
Building Permits of New House in 2001 as Instrument Variable 
Dependent Variable: College Enrollment Delay1 
  (1) (2) 
Change in Number of Permits of New Housing 
Unit, 2001 (in hundreds) 0.0009  0.0003 
  (0.0008) (0.0009) 
Black -0.0019 0.0008 
  (0.0144) (0.0151) 
SES Quartile -0.0854*** -0.0845*** 
  (0.0060) (0.0061) 
Math Ability Quartile -0.0135*** -0.1355*** 
  (0.0052) (0.0052) 
Parental Education - 0.0429***  -0.0421*** 
  (0.0144) (0.0145) 
First-stage F-statistics 224.61 33.34 
R2 0.2076 0.2182 
County Level Covariates2 Y Y 
State Fixed Effects   Y 
N 6,870 6,870 
Data Source: Education Longitudinal Survey: 2002 restricted-use data 
1. Students who did not enroll in college by 2004 are defined as delayers. 
2. County Level Covariates include population size, unemployment rate, and 
urbanity index. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses     
* Statistically significant at the .1 level; ** at the .05 level; ***at the .01 level. 
All sample sizes are rounded to the nearest ten. 
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 Housing booms may have a persistent influence on students’ re-enrollment decisions. To 
estimate the enduring booming effect, I present the cumulative effect on male college enrollment 
for each post-high school graduation year9. Table 2.4 indicates that the negative effect of the 
booming housing market on overall college enrollment diminished two years after high school 
graduation. 
This result supplements the findings from previous studies that the negative effect of labor 
market shocks on education attainment is often on a temporal basis. Students who did not 
continue higher education in 2004 slowly returned over two years, and it is consistent with the 
descriptive statistics that most of the returners re-enrolled in college in the first two years. This 
                                                                                                                                                             
of the estimation. Given the insignificance of the first stage for women, there is no need to repeat the estimation for 
women.  
9 I exclude the students who reported college enrollment but did not provide their year of attendance, and those who 
provided conflicting information.  
Table 2.4 The Effect of Change in Number of Building Permits on Male College 
Enrollment Delay 
 (1)  (2) 
Outcomes Coefficient SE   Coefficient SE 
Ever enrolled in college by…      
1 year after high school completion -0.0015** (0.0007)  -0.0018** (0.0009) 
2 years after high school completion -0.0007 (0.0007)  -0.0010 (0.0007) 
3 years after high school completion 0.0004 (0.0009)  0.0001 (0.0008) 
4 years after high school completion 0.0008 (0.0010)  0.0005 (0.0009) 
5 years after high school completion 0.0003 (0.0010)  0.0000 (0.0009) 
6 years after high school completion 0.0003 (0.0009)  0.0000 (0.0008) 
7 years after high school completion 0.0002 (0.0008)  0.0000 (0.0008) 
8 years after high school completion -0.0006 (0.0007)  -0.0002 (0.0007) 
County Level Covariates Y  Y 
State Fixed Effects     Y 
N 6,420   6,420 
Data Source: Education Longitudinal Survey: 2002 restricted-use data 
Note: County Level Covariates include population size, unemployment rate, and urbanity 
index. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses     
* Statistically significant at the .1 level; ** at the .05 level; ***at the .01 level. 
All sample sizes are rounded to the nearest ten. 
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phenomenon may be correlated to the housing market bust in 2006 and 2007; the delayers who 
were affected by the housing boom might have returned to college when the economy declined. I 
examine this effect further in the following analyses. Beyond academic outcomes, I also examine 
the long-term booming effect on other long-term outcomes, such as the time taken to receive a 
bachelor degree, amount of loans, working full/part-time, etc. Overall, housing boom only has an 
effect on the total amount of student loans and working part-time; it decreased the total amount 
of student loans and decreased the number of people in part-time employment. The complete 
results are available in the appendix. 
2.6.2 Delaying Effects 
 Does short-term delay have a long-term effect on college enrollment? If the housing 
boom that occurred in 2001 only impacted long-term educational outcomes through the booming 
effect on college enrollment delay in 2004, I can use the building permit changes as an 
instrument to estimate the effect of delay on student academic outcomes. Table 2.5 presents the 
effect of delay on college enrollment in eight years for male high school graduates. The first two 
columns report the OLS estimates. It is not surprising to see significant negative coefficients in 
OLS results; 48% of delayers did not re-enroll in college by 2012, which is consistent with 
descriptive results. However, this does not mean that the possibility of college enrollment for 
delayers is 48 percentage points lower than for immediate enrollees. Firstly, the definition of the 
delay in my analysis may overestimate the number of “true delayers”, who have the intention to 
re-enroll after deferring their higher education plans. Among the delayers, some of them may not 
intend to enroll in college once they have completed high school. Secondly, OLS estimates are 
biased by self-selection and unobserved factors. Delayers are fundamentally different from non-
delayers in terms of demographics, educational aspiration, etc. These fundamental differences 
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could produce the result that fewer of them attended college compared to non-delayers. 
 
The third and fourth columns report preferable TSLS results using building permit 
changes as an instrumental variable10. Among males, the TSLS results with county-level 
covariates demonstrate a slightly smaller but insignificant effect on overall college enrollment, 
while the coefficient magnitude with both county-level and state-level controls in Column 4 is 
comparable to the OLS ones and significant at 0.1 level. Both estimates imply that male delayers 
are substantially unlikely to re-enroll in eight years. However, such noisy coefficients cannot 
                                                 
10 For a smaller standard error, TSLS with only county-level covariates is my preferred estimate. I focus on the 
results in column (3) in the following estimations. 
Table 2.5 OLS Estimates and TSLS Estimates of Effect of Delay on Male College 
Attendance in 8 Years 
Dependent Variable: Male College Attendance by the Third Follow-up in 2012 
  OLS OLS TSLS TSLS 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Not enroll immediately1 -0.4829*** -0.4824*** -0.3741 -0.5297* 
  (0.0091) (0.0092) (0.2626) (0.3175) 
Black 0.0312*** 0.0323*** 0.0323*** 0.0319*** 
  (0.0113) (0.0119) (0.0119) (0.0119) 
SES quartile 0.0135*** 0.0126*** 0.0252 0.0075 
  (0.0049) (0.0050) (0.0286) (0.0348) 
Math ability quartile 0.0332*** 0.0335*** 0.0473 0..0271 
  (0.0041) (0.0042) (0.0346) (0.0420) 
Parental Education 0.0485*** 0.0464*** 0.0514*** 0.0460*** 
  (0.0115) (0.0115) (0.0127) (0.0136) 
County Level Covariates2 Y Y Y Y 
State Fixed Effects  Y  Y 
N 6,420 6,420 6,420 6,420 
Data Source: Education Longitudinal Survey: 2002 restricted-use data 
Note: This table reports OLS and TSLS estimates of not enrolling immediately for the 
ELS2002 sample having valid geographic information and college attendance information.  
1. Students who did not enroll in college by 2004 are defined as delayers. 
2. County Level Covariates include population size, unemployment rate, and urbanity index. 
* Statistically significant at the .1 level; ** at the .05 level; ***at the .01 level. 




reject the null hypothesis that there is no statistically significant difference in the college 
enrollment rate between immediate college enrollees and delayers. This result is primarily driven 
by the reduced form: at least for men at the margin of college attendance, whose college 
enrollment timing is intensively affected by local construction markets, not enrolling in college 
immediately after high school does not necessarily make them abandon their college plans 
completely. When local housing markets flourish, some of the male high school graduates who 
had the intention to attend college may have postponed enrolling in college in favor of work, but 
gradually returned to school as the economy declined. This result is also consistent with the 
findings in the study of Charles et al. (2015), which documents the temporary negative effects of 
the housing boom on educational attainment, but in the long term, the cohort that has 
experienced larger housing market shocks will have “caught up” their on-time peers in terms of 
schooling by the end of the full boom and bust cycle.  
 The results for college choice are presented in Table 2.6. Although a weak significant 
result is found in overall college enrollment, marginal effects on four-year college enrollment 
and two-year college enrollment are substantial and statistically significant. A one-percentage 
increase in enrollment delay will cause a decrease of 2.21 times that in four-year college 
enrollment and an increase of 1.87 times that in two-year college. This result implies that 
enrollment delay changes student college choice significantly by channeling more marginal 
students to two-year colleges from four-year colleges, although it does not change overall college 
enrollment in general. 
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Nevertheless, the magnitude of the effect might be caused by other mechanisms besides delay. 
For example, if the building permit change directly affects four-year and two-year college 
enrollment, or via a path other than delay, the large reduced form will lead to an enlarged TSLS 
result. In the following mechanism analysis section, I disentangle these effects. 
 Table 2.7 presents the results for college completion. Compared to immediate enrollees, 
delayers are 87 percentage points less likely to complete any type of post-secondary education. 
In general, most of the negative effect on college completion is attributable to a lower four-year 
college completion rate. I find no significant result for two-year college enrollment, which is 
probably a mixed consequence of delayers’ higher tendency to enroll in two-year college and 
Table 2.6 TSLS Estimates of Effect of Delay on Male 4-Year/2-Year College Attendance 
in 8 Years 
Dependent Variable: Male 4-Year/2-Year College Attendance by the Third Follow-up in 2012 
  4-Year 4-Year 2-Year 2-Year 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Not immediately enroll1 -2.2104*** -1.5691** 1.8667** 1.0370 
  (0.7305) (0.6481) (0.8041) (0.6791) 
Black 0.0780** 0.0898*** -0.0444 -0.0561** 
  (0.0330) (0.0243) (0.0363) (0.0255) 
SES quartile -0.1448* -0.0793 0.1768** 0.0902 
  (0.0796) (0.0709) (0.0876) (0.0743) 
Math ability quartile -0.1329 -0.0534 0.1849* 0.0804 
  (0.0963) (0.0856) (0.1060) (0.0897) 
Parental Education -0.0269 -0.0179 0.0771** 0.0623** 
  (0.0355) (0.0277) (0.0391) (0.0290) 
County Level Covariates2 Y Y Y Y 
State Fixed Effects  Y  Y 
N 6,420 6,420 6,420 6,420 
Data Source: Education Longitudinal Survey: 2002 restricted-use data 
Note: This table reports OLS and TSLS estimates of not enrolling immediately for the 
ELS2002 sample having valid geographic information and college attendance information.  
1. Students who did not enroll in college by 2004 are defined as delayers. 
2. County Level Covariates include population size, unemployment rate, and urbanity index. 
* Statistically significant at the .1 level; ** at the .05 level; ***at the .01 level. 




lower probability to complete a degree. However, this estimation may be biased if some delayers 
who enrolled in four-year colleges were still enrolled in 2012. As such, the results are only 
presented as suggestive estimates of the impact of delay on college completion.  
 
2.6.3 Mechanism Analysis 
 To discuss the possible intermediate mechanism that IV takes effects through, I 
disaggregate the same reduced form for the college choice outcomes of immediate enrollments to 
observe whether building permit changes have any effect on immediate college choice. If the 
Table 2.7 TSLS Estimates of Effect of Delay on Male 4-Year/2-Year College Completion in 8 Years 
Dependent Variable: Male College Completion by the Third Follow-up in 2012 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 















Completion   
Not enroll immediately 1 -0.8740*** -0.6100* -1.0240*** -0.6620** 0.0902 -0.0187 
  -0.319 -0.335 -0.355 -0.3351 -0.2052 -0.3061 
Black -0.0373* -0.0330* 0.0112 0.0172 -0.0478*** -0.0495*** 
  -0.0197 -0.0185 -0.0193 -0.0164 -0.0131 -0.0133 
SES quartile -0.0321 -0.0041 -0.0435 -0.0044 0.0052 -0.0075 
  -0.0354 -0.0367 -0.0385 -0.0389 -0.0243 -0.0355 
Math ability quartile -0.0363 -0.00436 -0.0384 0.0058 -0.0043 -0.0182 
  -0.0424 -0.0444 -0.0479 -0.0443 -0.0277 -0.0396 
Parental Education -0.0072 -0.0004 -0.0176 -0.0107 0.0091 0.0085 
  -0.0211 -0.0199 -0.0224 -0.0164 -0.0162 -0.0161 
County Level Covariates2 Y Y Y Y Y Y 
State Fixed Effects   Y   Y   Y 
N 6,420 6,420 6,420 6,420 6,420 6,420 
Data Source: Education Longitudinal Survey: 2002 restricted-use data 
Note: This table reports OLS and TSLS estimates of not enrolling immediately for the ELS2002 sample 
having valid geographic information and college attendance information. 
1. Students who did not enroll in college by 2004 are defined as delayers. 
2. County Level Covariates include population size, unemployment rate, and urbanity index. 
* Statistically significant at the .1 level; ** at the .05 level; ***at the .01 level. 




effect of the permit on college choice is entirely attributable to delayed enrollment, there should 
not be any observable effect on the choice to attend college immediately; high school students 
who experienced a larger housing boom should be less likely to attend either four-year or two-
year college to the same extent. However, the estimates in Table 2.8 demonstrate that the 
increase in building permits results in more immediate two-year college enrollments and fewer 
immediate four-year college enrollments, which suggests that the local housing boom also 
reduces the likelihood of high school graduates to attend four-year colleges immediately. The 
negative effect on immediate college enrollment in Table 2.2 is a combined effect of the positive 
effect on immediate two-year college enrollment and the disproportionately larger negative 
effect on immediate four-year college enrollment. 
Table 2.8 Reduced Form for Male Immediate College Enrollment Choice 
  
4-year Immediate College 
Enrollment 
2-year Immediate College 
Enrollment  
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Change in Number of Permits of 
New Housing Unit, 2001 (in 
hundreds) -0.0046*** - 0.0028*** 0.0026*** 0.0008 
  (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0009) 
Black  0.0801***  0.0791***  -0.0803***  -0.0848*** 
  (0.0149) (0.0155) (0.0146) (0.0151) 
SES Quartile 0.1003*** 0.1018*** 0.0039 0.0040 
  (0.0063) (0.0063) (0.0062) (0.0061) 
Math Ability Quartile 0.1552*** 0.1531*** -0.0275*** -0.0246*** 
  (0.0052) (0.0052) (0.0051) (0.0051) 
Parental Education -0.0080  0.0025 0.0260*  0.0225 
  (0.0148) (0.0148) (0.0145) (0.0144) 
County Level Covariates2 Y Y Y Y 
State Fixed Effects   Y   Y 
N 6,420 6,420 6,420 6,420 
Data Source: Education Longitudinal Survey: 2002 restricted-use data 
1. Students who did not enroll in college by 2004 are defined as delayers. 
2. County Level Covariates include population size, unemployment rate, and urbanity index. 
* Statistically significant at the .1 level; ** at the .05 level; ***at the .01 level. 




However, delay still affects college choice. When we consider the reduced form by using 
delayed four-year/two-year college enrollment (delayers who re-enrolled) in Table 2.9, there is a 
significant effect for delayed two-year college enrollment, which suggests that delayed students 
who re-enrolled in college within eight years were inclined to choose two-year programs.  
 The other explanation for the extraordinarily large TSLS coefficients is that the housing 
market boom may have had a persistent influence on students’ enrollment decisions. To illustrate 
the enduring effect, I present the cumulative effect on overall enrollment and four-year/two-year 
college enrollment in the years after high school graduation in Figure 2.12. Specifically, Panel A 
visualizes the reduced form effect of building permit changes on the cumulative enrollment rate 
over the years presented in Table 2.3. For example, the cumulative effect in 2006 means the  
Table 2.9 Reduced Form for Male Delayed College Enrollment Choice 
  
4-year Delayed College 
Enrollment 
2-year Delayed College 
Enrollment 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Change in Number of Permits of New 
Housing Unit, 2001 (in hundreds) -0.0007 -0.0006 0.0016** 0.0014* 
  (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0007) 
Black  0.0168**  0.0192**  0.0262**  0.0279 
  (0.0080) (0.0083) (0.0112) (0.0127) 
SES Quartile -0.0110*** -0.0106*** -0.0235*** -0.0250*** 
  (0.0034) (0.0028) (0.0051) (0.0052) 
Math Ability Quartile 0.0004 0.0004 -0.0290*** -0.0303*** 
  (0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0043) (0.0043) 
Parental Education 0.0240***  0.0192** 0.0157  0.0178 
  (0.0079) (0.0079) (0.0121) (0.0122) 
County Level Covariates2 Y Y Y Y 
State Fixed Effects   Y   Y 
N 6,420 6,420 6,420 6,420 
Data Source: Education Longitudinal Survey: 2002 restricted-use data 
1. Students who did not enroll in college by 2004 are defined as delayers. 
2. County Level Covariates include population size, unemployment rate, and urbanity index. 
* Statistically significant at the .1 level; ** at the .05 level; ***at the .01 level. 




Figure 2.12 The Cumulative Effect of Local Building Permit Change on College Enrollment by 
Years 
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effect on the accumulated college enrollment rate by 2006 (including those who enrolled in 2004, 
2005 and 2006). The result for four-year and two-year college enrollment confirms the existence 
of the persistent effect on college choice. Again, the immediate positive effect on two-year 
college enrollment in 2004 suggests that the local housing boom directly attracted more 
immediate enrollees in four-year colleges to attend two-year colleges. However, the effect size 
on two-year college enrollment increases yearly as delayers slowly return to school. This is the 
same for the TSLS cumulative effect. It implies that enrollment delay affects returners by 
channeling more of them into two-year colleges.  
 Tables 2.10 and 2.11 present the estimations for various subgroups to examine 
heterogeneity in the booming effect. Table 2.10 presents heterogeneity in the first stage, 
measuring the temporary influence of the local housing market on college enrollment delay for 
male students by SES quartiles, and Table 2.10 shows the results by racial subgroups. 
Surprisingly, estimation indicates that the third quartile and fourth quartile are the most 
vulnerable groups in both SES and mathematical ability subgroup regressions. In contrast, there 
is nearly no significant effect on the lowest two quartiles. Seemingly, the bottom two quartiles 
and are “non-compliers”, whose college enrollment timing is barely affected by local housing 
markets, while the third and fourth quartiles are the groups whose actions comply with local 
housing markets. When we examine the heterogeneous effects by race, it is white students who 
are affected by the housing boom. This phenomenon might stem from the dominance of white 
workers in construction. According to the Bureau of Labor Economics, 88% of employees are 
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white, while blacks only represent 6% of the total employed. 
 
Table 2.10 Effect of Local Building Permit Change on Enrollment Delay by SES 
quartiles 
Dependent Variable: College Enrollment Delay1 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  1st Quartile 2nd Quartile 3rd Quartile 4th Quartile 
  (Lowest)     (Highest) 
Change in Number of Permits of 
New Housing Unit, 2001 (in 
hundreds) 0.0001 -0.0008 0.0070*** 0.0035** 
  (0.0013) (0.0019) (0.0015) (0.0017) 
Black -0.0113 -0.0312 -0.0104 0.0209 
  (0.0350) (0.0412) (0.0451) (0.0504) 
Math ability Quartile -0.1393*** -0.1251*** -0.1386*** -0.1176*** 
  (0.0157) (0.0141) (0.0128) (0.0140) 
Parental Education -0.0152 -0.0301 -0.0230 Omitted 
  (0.0305) (0.0323) (0.0497) Omitted 
County Level Covariates2 Y Y Y Y 
State Fixed Effects   Y   Y 
N 1,400 1,510 1,590 1,920 
Data Source: Education Longitudinal Survey: 2002 restricted-use data 
1. Students who did not enroll in college by 2004 are defined as delayers. 
2. County Level Covariates include population size, unemployment rate, and urbanity index. 
* Statistically significant at the .1 level; ** at the .05 level; ***at the .01 level. 





2.6.4  Robustness Check 
Table 2.11 presents the correlation between changes in building permits and employment 
in construction. The first row shows that, after accounting for a full set of county-level controls, 
building permit changes strongly predict the changes in overall construction employment; every 
increase in permit change by 100 in 2001 will lead to an increase of 42 employees in the 
construction labor market in 2003. In other words, counties with the larger size of building 
permit changes in 2001 experienced a larger increase in construction employment in 2003.  
  The result of using the percentage of change in permits instead of the number of permit 
changes is presented in Appendix. The insignificant result suggests that the percentage of change 
in permits is not an appropriate instrument for determining employment in the construction 
Table 2.11 Effect of Local Building Permit Change on Enrollment Delay by Racial 
quintiles 
Dependent Variable: College Enrollment Delay1 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  White Black Hispanic 
Change in Number of Permits of New 
Housing Unit, 2001 (in hundreds) 
0.0038** -0.0028 -0.0002 
  (0.0019) (0.0022) (0.0014) 
Black -0.1038*** -0.0688*** -0.0331 
  (0.0107) (0.0234) (0.0224) 
Math ability Quartile -0.1043*** -0.1107*** -0.0907*** 
  (0.0095) (0.0226) (0.0156) 
Parental Education -0.0237 -0.0577 -0.0314 
  (0.0280) (0.0497) (0.0430) 
County Level Covariates2 Y Y Y 
State Fixed Effects Y Y Y 
N 3,600 790 870 
Data Source: Education Longitudinal Survey: 2002 restricted-use data 
1. Students who did not enroll in college by 2004 are defined as delayers. 
2. County Level Covariates include population size, unemployment rate, and urbanity index. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
* Statistically significant at the .1 level; ** at the .05 level; ***at the .01 level. 
All sample sizes are rounded to the nearest ten. 
60 
 
market. As mentioned previously, this is because percentage change might not be able to 
precisely reflect the size of local market shocks when the number of permit changes is small but 
the percentage of changes is large. Although a total number of building permits is significantly 
correlated to the total employment in the construction sector, it reflects the baseline housing 
market conditions instead of any local market shocks.   
To ensure that three years is an appropriate leading span, I conduct a falsification test 
using a two-year lead for building permit changes instead. The results are presented in Appendix. 
Clearly, no significant results are found. Similarly, only the estimation for the test using a lead of 
one year for building permit changes with county-level covariates is statistically significant, 
while insignificant results are reported for the estimation with both state-fixed effects and 
county-level covariates. The falsification test result suggests that a three-year lead for building 
permit changes is appropriate and has the strongest first stage. 
2.7 Summary 
This study contributes to the existing literature by providing new evidence that, firstly, 
the opportunity cost of college enrollment (i.e., foregone employment opportunities) has an 
influence on the decision of enrollment timing, and secondly, enrollment delay affects students’ 
choice of college. The empirical evidence supports the hypothesis that higher opportunity cost 
would deter the students at the margin of college attendance from obtaining a post-secondary 
education, particularly young males whose employment heavily depends on the low-skilled job 
market. Furthermore, not enrolling immediately makes delayers more likely to choose two-year 
colleges, which usually leads to lower completion rates. Therefore, policies designed to improve 
the employment and earnings opportunities of low-skilled workers, such as public jobs programs, 
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wage subsidies, and minimum wage increases, could have the unanticipated effect of enticing 
students to postpone their education plans. 
This research will benefit policies that are designed particularly for students who are 
vulnerable to the cost of attending college. When unskilled job markets flourish, delaying college 
could well be a rational decision. Nevertheless, some students might be led to a suboptimal 
decision if they mistakenly place more emphasis on the present. Therefore, it is imperative to 
identify the target population and investigate how to effectively help them during the transition 
from high school to college.  
Overall, enrollment timing is a field with little research attention. My study addresses this 
gap by providing evidence for the determinants of college enrollment timing and the 
consequences of delay. In contrast to the prior literature (e.g. Charles et al., 2015), my study 
documents a significant effect of housing boom on male high school graduates and no effect on 
females, as my study is able to examine the substitute effect without the confounding from the 
wealth effect caused by the boom. My findings are consistent to other papers on low-skilled 
biased labor market shocks (Black et al., 2005; Cascio & Narayan, 2015), which show local 
labor demand shocks have been biased toward low-skilled males.  
However, there are still several limitations to this research. Firstly, my paper only 
addresses the causes of delay. Once students delay, what makes them re-enroll (or not)? This 
question remains unanswered in this paper, but it is extremely crucial when we consider the 
outcomes of delay. Secondly, due to the limitations of the data, the external validity of my 
research is subject to the specialty of the cohort. It is important to reiterate that the cohort in the 
sample is unique, as it faced an unprecedented housing boom in high school and an equally 
unprecedented recession in later years. It is unclear whether delayers would ultimately return to 
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college even in the absence of a recession. Third, I cannot conclusively state the effect of delay 
on labor market outcomes, since the most recent survey was conducted in 2012, when some of 
the delayers were still enrolled and their earnings were not stable. Furthermore, the local labor 
demand shock is not appropriate for the research on delayer’s labor market outcomes. A great 
deal of literature has shown the initial labor market conditions can have direct long-term effects 
on earnings (Beaudry et al., 2016; Genda et al., 2012; Kahn, 2010; Oreopoulos et al., 2012; 
Schmieder & Von Wachter, 2010). To address this gap, Chapter 3 examines the earning 




Chapter 3. Timing Matters: How Delaying College Enrollment Affects Earnings 
Trajectories11 
3.1 Introduction 
In recent years, educational counselors and universities have increasingly promoted the 
“gap year model” (Hoe, 2015). Malia Obama, President Obama’s daughter, was called a 
“trendsetter” by taking a gap year prior to her enrollment at Harvard University (McPhate, 2016). 
Nowadays, all eight Ivy Leagues universities have encouraged their admitted students to take a 
gap year to travel, work, or engage in productive activities that may better prepare them 
academically and developmentally. Some schools, including Princeton, Tufts, the University of 
North Carolina at Chapel Hill, the New School, and Elon University actually provide financial 
aid for students doing so12. However, not all students choose to delay. According to the 
ELS:2002 (Table 1.1), 27 percent of the delayed enrollees name financial concerns as the main 
reason for delay respectively. This rate is higher for black and Hispanic students, more than 30 
percent delay constrained financially. Less than 10 percent use the gap year to pursue interests or 
take a break.  
Yet there is very little rigorous research to compare the earning outcomes, let alone 
earning trajectories of delayers and on-time enrollees. On the one hand, Kane (1996) suggests 
that working instead of enrolling in college allows individuals to save for college, defer paying 
college tuition, and enjoy short-term consumption benefit. Some also believe that accumulating 
working experience before college may increase the competitiveness of delayers after college 
(Dellas & Sakellaris 2003) though to what extent the returns to pre-college experience matter for 
post-college employment remains unanswered. On the other hand, delay enrollment may lower 
                                                 
11 This chapter is coauthored with Vivian Yuen Ting Liu. 
12 Information is from Gap Year Association (https://www.gapyearassociation.org/financial-aid.php). 
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the likelihood of enrolling and completing a college education, thus implicitly depresses the 
supply of skilled labor.  
While most returns to education studies compare the earning outcomes at certain points 
in time, a number of recent papers have pointed out the effect of education credentials on both 
the starting wage and earning’s growth over time (Böckerman et al., 2017; Hanushek et al., 
2017; Jaggars & Xu, 2016; Minaya & Scott-Clayton, 2017). For example, as Jaggars and Xu 
(2016) suggest that the sizable parts of positive returns of community college credentials are not 
due to immediate gains in earnings right after graduation, but rather to increases in earnings 
growth over time. Inspired by these emerging studies, we speculate the earnings difference 
between delayers and on-time enrollees may change over time. In addition, since delayers tend to 
work before college and during college, it would be interesting to see how their earning 
trajectories are different from on-time enrollees who have little work experience prior to 
graduation. 
In this chapter, we use data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 
(NLSY97) to address four research questions:  
1. What are the characteristics of individuals who delay college enrollment?  
2. Do different types of delayers and on-time enrollees have different labor market trajectories?  
3. How does delaying college enrollment affect educational and labor market outcomes over 
time? 
4. What are the key determinants of the wage differentials between on-time enrollees and 
delayers? 
Our primary contributions to the research literature are threefold. First, while most 
studies on the returns to education have looked at outcomes four to six years after initial college 
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enrollment, we analyze student outcomes up to 13 years after high school completion. Second, in 
addition to comparing earnings outcomes at certain points in time, we examine the effects of 
delayed college enrollment on earnings trajectories. Finally, almost all existing studies on the 
effects of delayed college enrollment on labor market outcomes are conditional on eventual 
college enrollment and therefore exclude delayers who failed to return.  Since college attendance 
is one of the outcomes of delay, Angrist and Pischke (2008) recommend against estimating on a 
sample conditional on an outcome, since it will introduce selection bias.  Our study attempts to 
reduce this selection bias by including non-college-attendees in the analysis. As the data have no 
information on student’s college intentions, we might include some non-enrollees who had no 
intention to pursue postsecondary education and cause a slight overestimation of the impact of 
the delay13.   
Our main results indicate that delayers enjoy an earnings advantage over on-time 
enrollees during the first five years after high school graduation, after which their earnings 
trajectories reverse and on-time enrollees experience much greater earnings gains than delayers 
do. The earnings penalty associated with delayed college enrollment is positively correlated with 
the duration of the delay. Differences in student characteristics explain only one-third of the pay 
gap between delayers and on-time enrollees; the rest is explained by delayers’ reduced likelihood 
of attending and obtaining a degree at a four-year college. 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review related literature 
on the outcomes associated with delayed college enrollment. In Section 3, we introduce a 
conceptual framework for college entry timing and predict the effects of delayed college 
enrollment on labor market trajectories. In Section 4, we describe our data and the empirical 
                                                 
13 We attempt to mitigate such overestimation by examining the cumulative effects over years and investigating the 
change in the effect sizes, which decreases the impact from the never enrollees to some extent.  
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methods we use to estimate the effects of delayed college (propensity score matching, or PSM) 
and the mechanism of the effects (Oaxaca decomposition). Section 5 presents the results, and 
Section 6 concludes the paper. 
3.2 Background 
Only a few studies have looked at the academic and employment outcomes of delayed 
college enrollment. Most of these focused on cohorts prior to 1990, and the only two that 
employed quasi-experimental approaches used more recent Canadian data. More research on this 
topic is clearly needed. 
Prior studies have shown that college postponement could harm individuals’ academic 
aspirations and outcomes. Using data from the National Education Longitudinal Study of 1988, 
Bozick and DeLuca (2005) found that delayers were 64 percent less likely to complete a 
bachelor’s degree, since only 24 percent of delayers enrolled in four-year institutions. Niu and 
Tienda (2013), looking at a sample of students who graduated from Texas high schools in 2002, 
similarly found that delayers were 40 percentage points less likely than on-time enrollees to be 
enrolled at a baccalaureate-granting institution four years after high school. In the descriptive 
analysis, Horn, Cataldi, and Sikora (2005) found that delayers were 18 percentage points less 
likely than on-time enrollees to complete any college credential.  
To our knowledge, only seven studies have examined the effects of interrupted schooling 
on labor market outcomes. Two looked specifically at interruptions between high school and 
college (Ferrer and Menendez, 2014; Holmlund, Liu, and Skans, 2008), and five investigated 
schooling interruptions that were less specific in timing (Fortin and Ragued, 2016; Griliches, 
1980; Light, 1995; Marcus, 1984; Monks, 1997), with mixed results. Five of the studies found 
that interrupted schooling had a negative to zero effect on earnings (Marcus, 1984; Monks, 1997; 
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Light, 1995; Griliches, 1980; Holmlund, Liu, and Skans, 2008), while the two Canadian studies 
found positive returns. 
As previous research has suggested that delayers tend to be of low socioeconomic status 
(SES) or relatively low academic ability (Bozick and DeLuca, 2005; Hearn, 1992; Horn, Cataldi, 
and Sikora, 2005; Johnson, 2013; Rowan-Kenyon, 2007), directly comparing the outcomes of 
delayers and on-time enrollees may produce biased estimates. Therefore, among the studies 
mentioned above, the three quasi-experimental studies—Light (1995), Ferrer and Menendez 
(2014), and Fortin and Ragued (2016)—are of greatest interest.  
Using a random effect approach, Light (1995) exploited the deviations from individual 
means of each time-varying factors as instrumental variable and found that work experience 
gained during gap years was not valued as highly in the labor market as work experience 
obtained after college. She found that a college graduate who delays college enrollment to work 
for four years receives a 17 percent lower wage than an on-time enrollee who has four years of 
post-college work experience. This finding is consistent with descriptive results from Holmlund, 
Liu, and Skans (2008) indicating that the returns to post-college work experience at age 35 are 
3.5 times larger than the returns to precollege work.  
Fortin and Ragued (2016) and Ferrer and Menendez (2014) reached opposite results and 
suggested that full-time work before college can increase subsequent wages by helping delayers 
learn about their abilities and aspirations and the labor market returns to a degree. These two 
studies used unemployment rate before high school graduation as instrumental variable and studied 
different cohorts of the Canadian National Graduates Survey. Fortin and Ragued concluded that 
temporary schooling interruptions led to an average increase of 21 percent in post-college starting 
wages for men who worked full-time during their out-of-school spell. Ferrer and Menendez found 
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that the returns to schooling interruptions between high school and college are 10 percent for 
bachelor’s degree holders and 14 percent for two-year degree holders.  
Overall, the literature on delayed college enrollment to date is mixed. Two quasi-
experimental studies found positive results from delayed enrollment, but their focus on Canadian 
students means they may have limited implications within the context of the United States, and 
the restriction of their samples to college graduates means they do not capture any effects of 
delay on college enrollment and completion. Using a PSM method and national data from the 
United States, our paper contributes to the existing literature by addressing issues related to 
selection bias, focusing on a broader range of students, and providing implications for the U.S. 
postsecondary context. 
3.3 Conceptual Framework 
In the traditional model of human capital investment developed by Mincer (1958) and 
Becker (1962), the decision to defer college enrollment is based on its marginal benefits and 
costs. Kane (1996) argued that according to the human capital model, deferring college entry is 
not a rational decision in a perfect market with no borrowing constraints and perfect information: 
Postponing enrollment allows individuals to enjoy short-term employment benefits and defer the 
costs of college, but in doing so, they also defer the returns to postsecondary education. As long 
as higher education is beneficial, deferring college payoffs is more harmful in the long run, and 
postponing college entry would result in lower lifetime earnings.  
To illustrate this theoretically, Scenario 1 in Figure 3.1 depicts earnings trajectories for 
on-time enrollees and delayers under the best-case scenario for delayers.14 Suppose two 
individuals graduate from high school at the same time at age 18: One, represented by the solid 
                                                 
14 Delayers who failed to reenroll in college are not specifically discussed in the theoretical framework, as their 
earnings trajectory is conceptually equivalent to the typical high school graduate’s. 
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red line, enrolls in college immediately after graduating high school, and the other, depicted by 
the black dashed line, works for four years between high school and college. We make three 
assumptions in our model:  
1. Both individuals take four years to complete college. 
2. Returns to college are the same regardless of students’ age at college entry. 
3. Salaries increase at the same rate with experience regardless of whether the work 
experience takes place before or after college, following Kane’s (1996) model. 
 
Figure 3.1 Theoretical Wage Trajectories for On-Time Enrollees and Delayers  
Scenario 1: 




















Under these assumptions, the on-time enrollee begins college at age 18 and enters the 
workforce after graduating at age 22, earning a starting salary of 𝑊୓୘ଶଶ. Assuming wage growth is 
consistent over time, this individual will receive a salary of 𝑊୓୘ସ଴ at age 40. The delayer, 
meanwhile, enters the workforce after high school graduation and earns a starting salary of 𝑊ୈଵ଼. 
This salary grows to 𝑊ୈଶଶ by age 22, at which point the delayer enrolls in college. After 
graduating from college, the delayer earns 𝑊ୈଶ଺, which equals the wage he or she received prior to 
entering college plus the returns to a college degree, and from that point onward has the same 
wage trajectory as the on-time enrollee. In this model, the wage premium for having a college 
degree versus a high school diploma is β =  𝑊ୈଶ଺ −  𝑊ୈଶଶ  = 𝑊୓୘ଶଶ  −  𝑊ୈଵ଼ for both individuals; 
the delayer experiences no wage penalty.  
This model may not be realistic, however, since not all human capital investment and on-
the-job training yields the same returns (Ben-Porath, 1967). Work experience accumulated prior to 
college may not be relevant to employers after college graduation, so the returns to this experience 
may be lower than the returns to post-college experience. In Scenario 2, therefore, we relax our 
third assumption so that precollege work experience is not valued in the labor market after college. 
In this scenario, the delayer has a horizontal wage trajectory before college and the same starting 
salary as the on-time enrollee (𝑊ୈ ଶ଺ = 𝑊୓୘ଶଶ). In this case, at every age post-college, the delayer 
makes less than the on-time enrollee.  
Finally, we relax our first and second assumptions to account for the potential effects of 
delayed enrollment on college choice, degree completion, and earnings. For example, most 
delayers do not have access to high school counselors after graduation, and without sufficient 
information on colleges, they may apply to and enroll in colleges that are poorly matched to their 
abilities (Dillon and Smith, 2013; Roderick, Nagaoka, and Coca, 2009). Horn, Cataldi, and 
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Sikora (2005) found that delayers are less likely to persist and graduate, thus lowering the returns 
to college education. Such a scenario is illustrated in Scenario 3, where the delayer experiences 
lower returns to college (𝑊ୈଶ଺ −  𝑊ୈଶଶ < 𝑊୓୘ଶଶ  −  𝑊ୈଵ଼) and slower wage growth. Here, the loss 
experienced by the delayer is caused not only by the delayed college payoff but also by the 
wasted precollege work experience and lower returns to higher education 
Figure 3.1 Theoretical Wage Trajectories for On-Time Enrollees and Delayers 
Scenario 2:  
Precollege Work Experience Yields No Post-College Returns 
 
Yet even Scenario 3 may not truly reflect the difference in the earnings trajectories of 
delayers and on-time enrollees. Having received full-time earnings for a few years, it may be 
difficult for delayers to reduce their work hours and enroll full-time. The academic momentum 
literature indicates that part-time enrollment is related to lower completion rates and a longer 
time to degree (Calcagno, Crosta, Bailey, and Jenkins, 2007; Choy, 2002), so the earnings 
trajectories of delayers may be shifted to the right even further. For a similar reason, delayers 
















may opt for short degree programs, such as those offered by community colleges (Horn, Cataldi, 
and Sikora, 2005). While some selective community college programs offer similar returns to a 
bachelor’s degree, the average wage of a bachelor’s degree holder is still higher than that of a 
community college graduate. For some, choosing to delay enrollment may prevent them from 
ever going to college as they may lose the eligibility to scholarship15 or be unable to resume full-
time study after several years of gap. Under this worst-case scenario, the earning trajectories of 
delayers would be the same those of high school graduates.  
Figure 3.1 Theoretical Wage Trajectories for On-Time Enrollees and Delayers 
Scenario 3:  
Precollege Work Experience Yields No Post-College Returns, and College Yields Lower 
Returns for Delayers 
 
                                                 
15 For example, students who work significantly the year before entering college will be penalized in the 
determination of the Expected Family Contribution (EFC), the amount that a family is estimated to be able to 
provide towards higher education expenses (Long, 2008). Consequently, working before college enrollment will 





















3.4 Method  
3.4.1 Data  
To compare the outcomes of delayers and on-time enrollees, we draw on data from the 
NLSY97, a nationally representative longitudinal survey of Americans born between 1980 and 
1984 who were 12 to 17 years old during their initial interview in 1997. This cohort has been 
surveyed 17 times—annually from 1997 to 2011 and biennially thereafter (in 2013 and 2015). 
The NLSY97 contains comprehensive data on educational and labor market outcomes, as well as 
detailed individual information on respondents’ demographics, household characteristics, SES, 
academic performance, and social activities. 
We define delayers as those not attending college by October of their high school 
graduation year if they graduated between January and July or by the following February if they 
graduated after July. Our definition includes individuals who eventually entered college and 
those who never attended college. Previous studies on delayed enrollment have often excluded 
individuals who never enrolled in college, but because delaying enrollment may impact 
individuals’ decision to enroll and their choice of college, examining outcomes conditional on 
college enrollment may positively bias our estimates.  
Our final sample contains 6,717 respondents who graduated from high school between 
1998 and 2003. Table 3.1 provides a descriptive summary of the sample disaggregated by 
enrollment timing. About 58 percent of respondents enrolled in college on time; 21 percent 
delayed college enrollment but enrolled by 2015; 21 percent never enrolled in college. 
Disproportionately more Black, Hispanic, and male students delayed college enrollment. Short-
term delayers (those who delayed college enrollment less than three years) were more likely to 
live in metropolitan areas, where job opportunities may be ample. In general, delayers tended to 
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> 7 Years 
Never 
Enrolled 
Individual demographics       
White 61% 65% 53% 52% 49% 58% 
Black 24% 21% 28% 34% 35% 27% 
Hispanic 20% 17% 25% 23% 19% 24% 
Other race 13% 13% 17% 13% 14% 14% 
Female 51% 55% 51% 50% 49% 40% 
Birth year 1982 1982 1982 1982 1982 1982 
High school graduation year 2000 2000 2000 2001 2000 2001 
Lived in urban area in 1997 73% 73% 79% 73% 73% 67% 
Lived in Northeast in 1997 18% 18% 18% 15% 16% 17% 
Lived in North Central region in 1997 24% 25% 21% 22% 25% 22% 
Lived in South in 1997 36% 34% 34% 41% 39% 38% 
Lived in metropolitan area in 1997 82% 84% 85% 79% 76% 77% 
Household demographics       
Household size 4.49 4.42 4.54 4.49 4.54 4.64 
Highest years of parental education 13.57 14.33 12.98 12.96 12.76 12.05 
Household net worth in 1997 78,234 101,130 53,535 49,979 41,030 42,241 
Household income in high school 
graduation year 
61,196 73,127 48,402 39,989 37,932 45,174 
Lived with both parents in high school 
graduation year 
55% 62% 47% 40% 31% 46% 
High school characteristics       
Public school 94% 91% 96% 98% 99% 98% 
< 299 students 6% 7% 5% 6% 6% 6% 
300–499 students 10% 10% 8% 8% 10% 10% 
500–749 students 20% 20% 20% 17% 17% 20% 
750–999 students 16% 15% 14% 18% 12% 19% 
Pupil–teacher ratio < 14 22% 23% 18% 21% 22% 22% 
Pupil–teacher ratio 14 to < 18 33% 33% 31% 31% 36% 32% 
Pupil–teacher ratio 18 to < 22 21% 21% 22% 23% 15% 21% 
Academic preparation       
High school grade point average 2.91 3.10 2.75 2.64 2.51 2.55 
ASVAB score percentile 50.90 60.17 46.39 42.12 39.22 29.94 
Expectation to earn college degree by 30 78% 88% 77% 67% 66% 59% 
Other characteristics in high school       
Married/cohabiting in graduation year 6% 3% 7% 11% 13% 12% 
Pregnant/got someone pregnant in 
graduation year 
6% 3% 9% 14% 16% 10% 
Number of children in graduation year 0.06 0.02 0.09 0.15 0.14 0.09 
Health condition in graduation year  
(5 = excellent) 
4.04 4.12 3.94 3.97 3.96 3.87 
Arrests in high school  0.06 0.03 0.07 0.07 0.10 0.11 
Ever drank alcohol in graduation year 61% 64% 60% 55% 60% 53% 
N 6,717 3,919 762 349 269 1,418 
Note. ASVAB = Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery.   
Source: NLSY 97 
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come from families with lower parental education and fewer financial resources. Among 
delayers, those who delayed for over seven years were the least likely to live with both parents 
the year they completed high school. High school characteristics were comparable for delayers 
and on-time enrollees, Academic performance varied substantially across the groups, with 
greater lengths of delay corresponding with lower academic preparation levels (i.e., lower high 
school grade point averages [GPA]) and expectations regarding educational attainment. Delayers 
were also more likely to be married or cohabiting, to become pregnant or impregnate someone, 
to have children, to experience health problems, and to be arrested in the year of their high 
school graduation. 
3.4.2 Propensity Score Matching 
The ideal way to estimate the effects of delayed college enrollment on student outcomes 
would be to randomly assign students to delay or enroll on time, so that any difference in their 
outcomes could be attributed to their enrollment timing. However, such randomization is not 
possible in practice. Even if a group of students were willing to participate in a randomized 
controlled trial (which is extremely unlikely), the ideal random assignment would involve 
multiple steps. First, after high school graduation, some students would need to be randomly 
selected to attend college and others to decline to enroll. Second, among college attendees, some 
would need to be randomly selected to attend college immediately and some to delay their 
enrollment. Third, researchers would need to track these students for a lifetime and compare their 
educational and employment outcomes. Moreover, the effects of delaying college enrollment 
would accumulate over time, such that students would encounter obstacles impeding them from 
reenrolling and completing college. For researchers to estimate the effects of delaying enrollment 
conditional on college enrollment or completion, they would have to conduct additional 
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randomizations to assign some students to return to college, and then to complete college, 
making this “ideal” experimental design extremely complex. 
Even if a randomized experiment fulfilled all these requirements, it still would not be 
able to provide evidence on the real-world factors that cause students to delay college 
enrollment, which is necessary to inform policy. We are therefore unable to employ an 
experimental design, so we need to address issues of selection bias in our empirical strategy. 
However, this “ideal experiment” guides our empirical approach to studying the effects of 
delayed college enrollment in cumulative ways.  
To mitigate observable selection bias, we use a propensity score matching (PSM) 
approach to compare the outcomes of delayers and on-time enrollees with similar propensities to 
delay college enrollment. Although PSM does not eliminate unobservable selection bias, 
incorporating PSM still confers several advantages above a simple ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regression. First, OLS can only control for confounding factors by adding covariates, but 
observations lacking common support cannot be compared directly by linear exploration via 
covariates. PSM ensures that the treated individuals are compared only with those in the control 
group who are most similar in terms of observable characteristics. Second, a PSM approach 
sheds light on the treatment selection process, describing factors that correlate with delayed 
college enrollment.  
Even though it is impossible to rule out unobservable biases using PSM, this approach is 
suitable for investigating our research questions. First, our data are longitudinal and include 
measures of the main time-variant and time-invariant factors that we suspect lead to delayed 
enrollment, such as detailed individual demographics, family income, school characteristics, 
student ability, and some key life events. Second, other than these controlled factors, enrollment 
77 
 
delay can be affected by some known idiosyncratic components, such as sudden economic or 
academic shocks. Third, our sample includes a large number of delayers, enabling us to build 
treatment and control groups with enough common support. 
To investigate the determinants of delayed enrollment empirically, then, we first model 
student enrollment timing using logistic regression: 
𝑃𝑟(𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑦 = 1) = Φ(𝑋ᇱβ) (1) 
In this model, Φ is the cumulative distribution function of a standard normal distribution, and X 
is a vector of factors that might affect enrollment timing. According to our conceptual 
framework, the timing of students’ college enrollment choice is a function of the marginal 
benefits and marginal costs of college enrollment. We include geographic information,16 high 
school graduation year, and their interaction in the model to control for local market differences. 
(For a complete list of variables included, see Table 3.2.) We also implement the logistic 
regression model for men and women separately to see if the determinants affect them 
differently.17 
To implement PSM, we apply the resulting parameters from the first logistic model to 
construct each individual’s propensity score. The basic idea of PSM is to form a counterfactual 
comparison group of on-time enrollees whose likelihood of delaying college enrollment is 
similar to the delayers’. By comparing the outcomes of two groups with similar pretreatment 
characteristics, we can calculate the differences in outcomes that can be attributed to the 
treatment. The underlying identifying assumption is that the selection is based on observable 
characteristics. Any factors that jointly affect both treatment and subsequent outcomes have to be 
                                                 
16 Detailed geographic information, such as state, metropolitan statistical area, and county, is not available in the 
public-use NLSY97 data. The smallest geographic division we are able to disaggregate our sample by is census 
region.  
17 In addition to looking at the determinants of delayed enrollment in general, we use a multinomial logistic model to 
examine the determinants of different lengths of delay. The full results are presented in the appendix. 
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included in the model. If the assumption holds and there is overlap between the groups, the PSM 
estimator for the average treatment effect for the treated is the mean difference in outcomes of 
the treatment and comparison groups with sufficient common support, appropriately weighted by 
the propensity score distribution of delayers. Our outcomes of interest include enrollment and 
completion at four- and two-year colleges, earnings, and work hours, all of which we examine by 
years relative to high school graduation. 
We then use caliper matching with a radius caliper of 0.05, with replacement and 
excluding observations without common support. This procedure allows us to match each 
delayer with an on-time enrollee within 0.05 on either side of the treatment propensity score.18 
We also use alternative methods of matching, but the results are highly robust, as we discuss in 
the results section. 
3.4.3 Oaxaca Decomposition 
To examine the factors contributing to the wage gap between delayers and on-time 
enrollees, we use an Oaxaca decomposition (Oaxaca, 1973). Equations 4 and 5 model the wages 
of delayers and on-time enrollees respectively as a function of college enrollment (𝐸𝑛𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙), 
degree attainment (𝐷𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒), and individual characteristics (𝑋).  
𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒୓୘ =  β୓୘ଵ 𝐸𝑛𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙୓୘ + β୓୘ଶ 𝐷𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒୓୘ + β୓୘ଷ 𝑋୓୘ + μ୓୘ (4) 
𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒ୈ =  βୈଵ 𝐸𝑛𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙ୈ + βୈଶ 𝐷𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒ୈ + βୈଷ 𝑋ୈ + μୈ (5) 
An Oaxaca decomposition disaggregates the raw differences in log earnings between the two 
groups into portions that can be explained by differences in these three types of factors. In our 
analysis, we focus on how college enrollment and degree completion contribute to the earnings 
                                                 
18 Caliper matching helps us avoid the risk of bad matching posed by nearest-neighbor matching if the nearest 
neighbor is far away. The caliper imposes a tolerance level on the maximum propensity score distance that meets the 
requirement of common support. 
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difference between the groups. Including both college enrollment and degree completion in the 
same equation could cause a severe multi-collinearity problem, so we conduct separate 
decompositions for them. 
3.5 Results 
3.5.1 Earnings Trajectories 
We begin by taking a graphical look at labor market trajectories for on-time enrollees and 
different types of delayers. Figures 3.2 and 3.3 show the patterns of earnings and annual hours 
worked over time by initial college enrollment timing relative to high school graduation. 
On-time enrollees started out earning less than the other groups and eventually earned the 
most. Their annual earnings were around $35,000 13 years after high school graduation, while 
delayers earned slightly above $30,000 at most.19 The earnings for on-time enrollees started to 
grow faster and exceed the earnings of delayers in the sixth year. From the seventh year onward, 
the earnings of on-time enrollees continued on an upward trajectory, while the earnings growth 
for the rest of the sample decelerated. These trajectories are most consistent with the third 
scenario we outlined in our conceptual framework (Scenario 3, Figure 3.1). Individuals who 
delayed college enrollment for more than seven years had the least favorable outcomes, with 
earnings trajectories even lower than those of individuals who never enrolled in college—which 
suggests that the college completion rate for this group is likely very low and that college is not 
worth the cost for long-term delayers. 
                                                 
19 Only positive earnings are included in these figures. Panel B of Figure 3.2 shows the earnings trajectories with 
zero earnings included, and the trends are similar but magnified. 
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Figure 3.2 Adjusted Yearly Earnings by Enrollment Status 
Panel A: $0 Excluded 
 





Figure 3.3 presents the annual work hour trajectories for different types of delayers and on-time 
enrollees. The horizontal red line marks 1,750 hours, which is equivalent to full-time 
employment.20 There are three important observations to be made from this figure. First, on-time 
enrollees tended to work part-time during college and started to have similar work hours to 
delayers after the sixth year post-high school graduation, as members of both groups on average 
worked full-time then. Second, delayers tended to work full-time even after they went back to 
school, which might explain why they experienced lower returns to postsecondary education: 
Full-time workers tend to choose two-year colleges or part-time programs that usually have 
lower completion rates (Bozick and DeLuca, 2005). Finally, short-term delayers (those who 
delayed enrollment less than three years) tended to work part-time before entering college, while 
longer-term delayers more often worked full-time. Therefore, for short-term delayers, the 
                                                 
20 The full-time employment definition is from the U.S. Department of Labor’s Bureau of Labor Statistics (2014) 
and the United States Census Bureau (2000) and is equivalent to 35 hours per week for 50 weeks. 
Figure 3.3 Annual Work Hours by Enrollment Status 
82 
 
opportunity cost of returning to school and studying full-time was lower than it was for longer 
term delayers. 
Both the earnings trajectories and the work hour trajectories suggest that delaying 
college enrollment produces less desirable labor market outcomes. Returning to school is also 
not an optimal choice for those who have delayed college enrollment for over seven years.  
3.5.2 Logistic Regression 
Table 3.2 reports the coefficients for each potential factor predicting delayed college 
enrollment for the full sample and by gender. Table A3 in the appendix reports the multinomial 
regression results for selection into different delay lengths.  
Both Black and Hispanic high school graduates are less likely than Whites to delay college 
enrollment. This is an unexpected finding, given that a higher proportion of Black and Hispanic 
students delayed college enrollment. It is possible that the job market for high school graduates 
prefers White candidates, so White graduates are more likely to work and delay college 
enrollment. Compared with women, men are more likely to delay enrollment, which probably 
reflects men’s preference for work, military duty, or other activities.  
Household characteristics are also important for predicting college enrollment timing. 
Students with more educated parents are less likely to delay enrollment, as more educated 
parents are able to provide more educational resources and more support during the college 
application and matriculation process, which helps keep students on the traditional education 
track. Both household net worth and household income are also negatively correlated with 
delayed enrollment, as more financial inputs decrease students’ need to work to save for college.  
School inputs influence college enrollment timing via school type and class size. Smaller 




Table 3.2 Logistic Regression Analysis: Potential Determinants of College Enrollment Delay 
 All  Male  Female 
 Coefficient SE  Coefficient SE  Coefficient SE 
Individual demographics         
Black -0.526*** [0.088]  -0.522*** [0.126]  -0.549*** [0.128] 
Hispanic -0.250** [0.101]  -0.135 [0.140]  -0.369** [0.149] 
Other race (except White) -0.181* [0.106]  -0.360** [0.149]  0.008 [0.152] 




Birth year -0.130** [0.051]  -0.234*** [0.070]  -0.008 [0.076] 
High school graduation year -0.004 [0.073]  0.101 [0.101]  -0.120 [0.107] 
Lived in urban area in 1997 -0.033 [0.078]  -0.094 [0.109]  0.033 [0.114] 
Lived in Northeast region in 1997 0.488 [0.357]  0.788 [0.482]  0.042 [0.558] 
Lived in North Central region in 1997 -0.056 [0.309]  0.122 [0.411]  -0.278 [0.476] 
Lived in Southern region in 1997 0.409 [0.287]  0.351 [0.393]  0.452 [0.427] 







Household size 0.040* [0.022]  0.055* [0.031]  0.024 [0.031] 
Highest year of parental education -0.123*** [0.012]  -0.127*** [0.017]  -0.120*** [0.018] 
Household net worth in 1997 (thousands) -0.002*** [0.000]  -0.002*** [0.000]  -0.001*** [0.000] 
Household income in high school 
graduation year (thousands) 
-0.004*** [0.001]  -0.004*** [0.001]  -0.003*** [0.001] 
Lived with both parents in high school 
graduation year 
-0.324*** [0.066]  -0.328*** [0.093]  -0.324*** [0.097] 
Attended public high school 0.892*** [0.186]  0.815*** [0.248]  0.981*** [0.286] 






School size < 299 students 0.154 [0.143]  0.110 [0.197]  0.246 [0.210] 
School size 300–499 students -0.128 [0.120]  -0.131 [0.168]  -0.121 [0.175] 
School size 500–749 students 0.039 [0.093]  0.029 [0.131]  0.037 [0.136] 
School size 750–999 students -0.009 [0.095]  -0.030 [0.135]  0.014 [0.138] 
Pupil–teacher ratio < 14 -0.261** [0.105]  -0.169 [0.147]  -0.366** [0.152] 
Pupil–teacher ratio 14 to < 18 -0.121 [0.090]  -0.137 [0.128]  -0.109 [0.129] 







High school GPA -1.307*** [0.079]  -1.226*** [0.111]  -1.403*** [0.116] 







Married or cohabiting  0.865*** [0.136]  0.650** [0.270]  0.995*** [0.161] 
Pregnant/got someone pregnant in high 
school graduation year 
0.583*** [0.136]  0.297 [0.216]  0.725*** [0.177] 
Number of children  0.683*** [0.153]  0.330 [0.530]  0.719*** [0.164] 
Health condition in high school 
graduation year (5 = excellent) 
-0.167*** [0.036]  -0.172*** [0.052]  -0.175*** [0.050] 
Arrests in high school graduation year 0.422*** [0.119]  0.415*** [0.137]  0.446* [0.244] 













*p < .1. **p < .05. ***p < .01.
Note: The dependent variable is if the student delay college enrollment after high school graduation 




Compared with private high school students, public high school students have a higher tendency 
to delay enrollment. Two proxies for academic ability, ASVAB scores and high school GPA, are 
both positively related to on-time college enrollment.21 
Unexpected life events in high school also affect college enrollment timing by imposing 
time constraints on students. Marriage and parenthood are the two major sources of such 
constraints. The role of spouse or parent alters time use and the distribution of financial resources 
(Bozick and DeLuca, 2005). Notably, most of the negative effects of marriage and parenthood on 
college enrollment timing are experienced by women. Arrests and health problems increase the 
likelihood of delayed enrollment equally for men and women. 
Overall, the logistic regression results are consistent with human capital theory and other 
sociological theories that posit that financial and time constraints obstruct on-time college 
enrollment.  
3.5.3 Propensity Score Matching 
Using the logistic regression results, we first show common support between the delayers 
and on-time enrollees in terms of their propensity to delay college enrollment. Figure 3.4 plots 
the distributions of delayers and on-time enrollees across the range of estimated propensity 
scores before and after matching. After matching, both groups have similar propensity scores. 
There is also sufficient overlap between the groups across the range of propensity scores, 
assuring common support.  
                                                 
21 We did not include measures for educational attainment expectations or ACT score because more than half of the 
sample has no data for these two variables. 
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Next, we check the match quality. Figure 3.5 shows that our observations for both 
delayers and on-time enrollees are well matched across the selected observable covariates. Each 
circle and asterisk represents the standard bias of the unmatched and matched observable 
covariates respectively.22 In most empirical studies, a standard bias below 5 percent after 
matching is seen as sufficient (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). In our model, the standard bias of 
most covariates is under 5 percent, except for Hispanic (7.5 percent) and living in a metropolitan 
                                                 
22 The standardized bias is the difference between the sample means of the treated and untreated subsamples as a 
percentage of the square root of the average sample variance in both groups. 




statistical area (5.7 percent). Given the small bias for a large number of other characteristics, we 
consider our model to be balanced.23  
We then examine two types of outcomes—education and labor market outcomes. The 
appendix tables include the complete results for both the OLS and PSM estimates of college 
enrollment, degree completion, and labor market outcomes by year and type of college. In 
general, the results confirm a small negative bias of the OLS estimations as a result of the 
selection into the decision to delay college enrollment. 
Figure 3.6 plots the PSM results for ever having enrolled in college by year, where each 
data point is a separate regression representing the effect of delaying college by the xth year after 
high school graduation.24 In the first year after high school graduation, delayers were 87 
percentage points less likely to have ever enrolled in any type of college. The absolute value of 
the effect size decreases with time, suggesting that some delayers have entered college gradually. 
                                                 
23 Full results and the balance test are provided in the appendix. 
24 All the results are statistically significant. 




By the 13th year after high school graduation, delayers were still over 50 percentage points less 
likely to have ever attended college. Notably, the trends for ever having enrolled in four-year and 
two-year colleges move in opposite directions – the effects on four-year college attendance are 
almost the same  in the first year and thirteen year (38.7 percentage points vs. 37.5 percentage 
points), while the effects on two-year college attendance reduced from 52.3 percentage points to 
34.5 percentage points25. It implies that delayers who returned to school were rarely to enroll in a 
four-year college. Albeit the larger effect on two-year college, delayers slowly re-enrolled in 
two-year colleges in the next thirteen years. The opposite trends indicate the students who are at 
the margin of attending two-year colleges are those mostly vulnerable to delay. 
  
                                                 
25 The sum of the effects on two-year and four-year college enrollment does not equal to the overall effect because 
some students attended both types of institutions. 
Figure 3.6 PSM Effects of Delaying on College Enrollment 
 






















Figure 3.7 displays the PSM results for bachelor’s degree and associate degree 
completion over time. In general, delayed enrollment produces long-term negative effects on 
degree completion, and the gap between delayers and on-time enrollees does not shrink over 
time. By the seventh year, when many on-time enrollees have completed postsecondary 
education, the gap in the overall completion rates reaches 32 percentage points. The pattern is 
similar when broken down into bachelor’s and associate degree completion, though the overall 
gap in associate degree completion rates is about 5 percentage points smaller than the overall gap 
in bachelor’s degree completion rates. The PSM results show that even though the enrollment 
gap between delayers and on-time enrollees narrows with time, delayers are unlikely to complete 
a degree, resulting in a stubborn gap in completion.  
We next examine the effects of delayed college enrollment on labor market outcomes and 
trajectories. Figure 3.8 shows that delaying college enrollment has a negative impact on long-
Figure 3.7 PSM Effects of Delaying on College Completion 
 





















term earnings, work hours, and full-time employment. In the first three years after high school 
graduation, delayers had higher earnings than did on-time enrollees, since most of the latter were 
still enrolled in college, while the delayers were working. In the second year after high school 
graduation, delayers earned $2,097 more than on-time enrollees did. However, delayers’ 
earnings gains in the fourth year dropped to -$704, as on-time enrollees began completing their 
postsecondary education and starting to work full-time. After that point, the earnings losses 
experienced by delayers only deepened. In the 13th year after high school graduation, delayers 
generally earned $7,470 less than on-time enrollees. The growing disparities between the two 
groups suggest that delayers earned much less than on-time enrollees did as a result of their 
lower college enrollment and completion rates. The early earnings benefits of delaying college 
enrollment cannot offset this long-term earnings penalty.  
The trends for work hours and full-time employment are similar. In the first four years 
after high school, delayers worked more and were more likely to work full-time. After that, the 
effects of delayed college enrollment on work hours were slightly negative. Delayers worked 100 
to 200 hours less per year than on-time enrollees did and were approximately 4 to 9 percentage 
points less likely to work full-time. The impacts on work hours and employment status are 
relatively small, given that on-time enrollees worked 1,875 hours on average and that 66 percent 
of them worked full-time in the 13th year after high school graduation. Consistent with the 
results shown in Figures 3.2 and 3.3, the result indicates that delayers were very likely to work 





Figure 3.8 PSM Effects of Delayed College Enrollment on Labor Market Outcomes 
by Year 
  
Source: Authors’ calculation based on NLSY 97 

















































3.5.4 Robustness to Alternative Specifications 
One major criticism of the PSM approach is that it may not adequately account for self-
selection bias. If our model ensures that two individuals have the same propensity to delay 
college enrollment, then what explains why one enrolls on-time and the other does not? For 
students at the margin of delaying college enrollment (who have a low propensity to delay), 
enrollment timing may be determined by some idiosyncratic variations (e.g., exogenous 
variations in local labor markets or sudden life shocks). But for students who have a higher 
propensity to delay but do not delay, the decision to enroll in college is more likely to be based 
on self-selection, and we may fail to capture this endogenous selection in the matching process.  
To eliminate such endogenous selection, we run a robustness check for inframarginal 
individuals only (observations with p-scores less than .6) as proposed by Scott-Clayton and 
Minaya (2015). The full results are presented in Appendix Tables A8 to A10. The effects of 
delaying on enrollment, completion, and employment are still negative and significant, but the 
effect sizes are slightly smaller. 
In addition, we test the robustness of our results using a wider caliper, using nearest-
neighbor matching, and using a probit regression instead of a logit regression to calculate p-
scores. Our results are consistent across all these alternative specifications. 
3.5.5 Sensitivity to Unobservable Selection 
Even after controlling for an extensive list of observable factors, we cannot rule out the 
possibility that delayers are different from on-time enrollees in unobservable ways. For this 
reason, it is important to measure the extent to which unobservables would bias our estimators. 
Following Oster’s (2017) approach, which assumes that unobservable selection is proportional to 
observable selection, for each estimation we calculate 𝛿, the degree of selection on 
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unobservables relative to observables that would be necessary to cancel out the effect. We use 
the value of 𝛿 = 1 as an appropriate cutoff suggested by Oster, meaning the unobservables must 
be at least as important as the observables to produce a treatment effect of zero.  
The results show that the effect of delaying on overall enrollment within 13 years is 
robust to unobservables that are up to 2.65 times as important as observables. The effect of 
delaying enrollment on overall degree completion is robust to unobservable factors that are up to 
3.59 times as important as observed factors. Finally, the negative 𝛿𝑠  for the effects on earnings 
mean that adding unobservable controls increases the magnitude of the effects, so unobservable 
bias would have to go in the opposite direction to cancel out any observable effects. The full 
results can be found in the Appendix Table A11. 
3.5.6 Oaxaca Decomposition 
Table 3.3 presents the results for three Oaxaca decomposition models, indicating the 
portion of the earnings gap between delayers and on-time enrollees explained by (1) student 
characteristics alone (Model 1), (2) student characteristics and college enrollment (Model 2), and 
(3) student characteristics and degree completion (Model 3).26 In total. on-time enrollees earned 
$12,126 more than delayers in the 13th year after high school graduation. Model 1 shows that 
student characteristics alone explain $6,227, or 51 percent, of the gap, leaving 49 percentage 
unexplained. After adding college enrollment information to Model 1, Model 2 is able to explain 
61 percent of the earnings gap: 42 percent is explained by individual characteristics and 19 
percent by enrollment outcomes.27 Finally, adding degree completion portion to Model 1, Model 
                                                 
26 We also tested the model by including student characteristics, college enrollment, and degree completion. The 
results suffered severely from multicollinearity; the contribution from college enrollment was almost absorbed by 
the contribution from degree completion. 
27 Up to 23 percent of the wage gap can be explained by lower four-year enrollment rates among delayers. Yet since 
more delayers earn two-year degrees, reducing the wage gap, only 19 percent of the wage gap is explained by 
college enrollment overall. 
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3 estimates the contribution of both individual characteristics and degree completion, which is 
collinear with college enrollment. The explanatory power of the entire model increases to 85 
percent—30 percent due to student characteristics and 55 percent due to the lack of degree 
attainment, mainly bachelor’s degree attainment (54 percent), among delayers. 
 
The Oaxaca decomposition results have three key takeaways. First, individual 
characteristics explain only one-third of the earnings gap between delayers and on-time 
enrollees, suggesting that the earnings gap could be drastically reduced by encouraging on-time 
enrollment. Second, four-year college enrollment and bachelor’s degree completion are the most 
influential factors contributing to the earnings gap between delayers and on-time enrollees. 
Finally, the ability of Model 3 to explain 85 percent of the wage gap gives us confidence in the 
validity of our Oaxaca decomposition model. 
3.6 Summary  
High school graduates often delay college enrollment. Over 40 percent of those in our 
sample did not enroll in college immediately, and 21 percent never enrolled in college by the end 
Table 3.3 Oaxaca Decomposition of the Earnings Gap between On-Time Enrollees and 
Delayers  
 
Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
Mean ($) % of Raw Difference 
 Mean ($) % of Raw Difference 
 Mean ($) % of Raw Difference 
Raw difference (annual wage) between 
on-time enrollees and delayers 
12,126*** 100%  12,126*** 100%  12,126*** 100% 






Student characteristics 6,227*** 51%  5,101*** 42%  3,612*** 30% 
College enrollment 
  
























 192*** 2% 
Unexplained 5,899*** 49%  4,685*** 39%  1,788** 15% 
Note. We compare the earnings in the 13th year after high school graduation. 




of the most current survey. Factors such as family resources, high school quality, academic 
performance, marriage, and teen pregnancy are key determinants of college enrollment timing. 
Female high school graduates are especially vulnerable to teen pregnancy compared with their 
male peers.  
Delaying college enrollment has long-term consequences for students’ academic 
attainment. Our PSM results suggest that delayers are much less likely to re-enroll in college, 
and if they do, they tend to attend two-year colleges. Compared with on-time enrollees, delayers 
in our sample were 37 percentage points less likely to have ever enrolled in a four-year college 
and 34 percentage points less likely to have ever enrolled in a two-year college 13 years after 
high school graduation. Delayers were also 23 percentage points less likely to have completed a 
bachelor’s degree and 19 percentage points less likely to have completed an associate degree by 
the end of the tracking period.  
Furthermore, though delayers earn more during the first several years after high school 
graduation, while on-time enrollees are attending college, their earnings soon begin to lag behind 
those of on-time enrollees, and this earnings gap increases substantially with time. The total 
earnings penalty experienced by delayers compared with on-time enrollees is at least $41,000 in 
the first 13 years after high school graduation. The lifetime penalty would be at least three times 
higher. Our Oaxaca decomposition results show that bachelor’s degree completion is the most 
important factor contributing to the earnings gap between delayers and on-time enrollees; 
differences in individual characteristics only explain about one-third of the wage gap.  
In considering the implications of our findings, it is important to keep in mind that there 
are several limitations to this study. First, our definition of delay may overestimate the number of 
“true delayers” by including individuals who do not intend to enroll in college. The lower college 
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enrollment rates among delayers may therefore not entirely reflect decisions by high school 
graduates to delay college enrollment. Yet limiting the sample to college enrollees would 
obscure one of the most important effects of delayed enrollment—its role in impeding students 
from reenrolling college, which is the primary consideration for students making decisions on 
enrollment timing. Second, although we found that individuals who delay college enrollment for 
different lengths of time have different labor market trajectories, the small sample size of the 
NLSY97 prohibits us from conducting a causal analysis for each type of delayer. Finally, though 
our validity tests provide some assurance that our method for estimating the effects of delayed 
enrollment is reasonable, our PSM results may still contain residual bias, as it is impossible to 
prove that we have fully accounted for all unobservable characteristics in our matching 
procedure. 
Despite these limitations, our study has clear policy implications. Delayed college 
enrollment is associated with lower college completion rates and lifetime earnings trajectories. 
Therefore, policymakers should encourage on-time enrollment and provide financial and 
informational guidance, especially for low-SES high school graduates. One obvious way to 
increase college-going would be to prevent “summer melt,” the phenomenon in which recent 
high school graduates who have been accepted to college decide not to enroll in the fall. 
Castleman, Arnold, and Wartman (2012) found that targeted college counseling and nudging text 
messages during the summer after high school graduation lead to substantially higher rates of 
college enrollment in the fall. Interventions could also potentially target recent high school 
graduates who are not in college and therefore have access to neither high school nor college 
counselors. High schools generally keep records of which of their students went to college, and 
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reaching out to recent graduates who did not enroll in college could potentially increase their 
college enrollment and improve their college choices. 
Finally, our descriptive results show that long-term delayers have lower earnings than 
students with no college experience. Long-term delayers may encounter greater barriers in 
transitioning from being a full-time worker to being a college student. Addressing the barriers 
experienced by nontraditional enrollees is thus important, especially for four-year universities, 







I find that a great proportion of high school graduates delay their college enrollment, 
meaning a "typical" student who proceeds an uninterrupted transition is not a convention as in 
our usual impression. This study will contribute to the existing literature by providing new 
evidence that, first, the opportunity cost of college enrollment (that is, foregone employment 
opportunities) matters for the decision of enrollment timing and, second, enrollment delay affects 
student college re-enrollment and choice. Third, this dissertation examines how delay affects 
earnings trajectories. And fourth, it identifies the key determinants of the wage differentials 
between on-time enrollees and delayers. 
I conclude that financial constraint is not the only explanation for the delay. Students 
might rationally adjust the timing of enrollment to maximize the welfare based on their personal 
capabilities, preferences, and economic conditions. Behavioral bias and sociological factors 
greatly influence college enrollment as well. I find out housing boom can influence student’s 
educational outcomes, especially for male students whose employment is heavily influenced by 
the low-skilled job market.  However, this paper finds a temporary delay in transition to college 
caused by a housing boom does not necessarily decrease 8-year college enrollment rate. Instead, 
college choice was affected by enrollment timing – four-year college enrollment rate declined, 
and two-year college enrollment rate rose, suggesting that delayers are more likely to choose 
two-year colleges if they re-enrolled. Propensity score matching results show that the earnings 
benefits experienced by delayers quickly fade out after their mid-20s and turn to significant 
losses over time. In the 13th year after high school graduation, delayers generally earned $7,470 
less than on-time enrollees. We find that 60 percent of the pay gap is explained by delayers’ 
reduced likelihood of attending and obtaining a degree at a four-year college. 
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This research will enlighten policy designing particularly for students vulnerable to the 
cost of attending college. It might be extremely difficult for policymakers to identify the entire 
population who have the intention to delay college enrollment because at the moment of leaving 
schools, some high school graduates who choose not to attend college immediately have no idea 
whether they want to return to school in the future. However, for those who have been accepted 
to college and signaled their intent to enroll but end up in some other places, it is relatively easy 
for policymakers to define the target population and mitigate unnecessary attrition. From 
Castleman and Page (2014)’s estimation, 10% to 40% of low-income students who have been 
admitted by postsecondary institutions do not persist on their initial plan. At least for this specific 
group of delayers, Castleman et al. (2012)’s research provides an effective and efficient solution 
to improve summer attrition issues. For low-income students, active college counseling and 
nudging text message during the summer after high school graduation leads to substantially 
higher rates of college enrollment in the following fall. 
From the perspective of colleges, preparation to address the barrier associated with non-
traditional enrollees is important. Apparently, college enrollment delay is not a temporary social 
phenomenon. It is necessary for institutions to make more effort on providing services to non-
traditional students. For example, although many community colleges offer flexible courses and 
programs, they typically provide little guidance to help new students choose a program of study 
and develop a plan for completing it (Bailey et al., 2015). For well-prepared traditional students, 
such flexibility is helpful. But the choices can be overwhelming for poorly prepared non-
traditional students. A well-defined degree map can be designed to ensure that the student is 
taking courses that will be applied toward degree requirements and also to ensure that a student 
can develop skills and abilities that can lead to increased success in the future. Summer bridge 
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programs adopted by some universities seem to be another promising approach for college to 
reach out to low-income, first-generation admitted students early in the summer before school 
begins (Castleman et al., 2012; Kezar, 2000).  
Overall, enrollment timing is a field with so little research attention. My study addresses 
the gap via a comprehensive overview of the mechanisms through which students choose to 
delay college enrollment, as well as provides evidence for the determinants of college enrollment 
timing and the consequences of delay. However, my research still has several limitations. First, 
my study attempts to emphasize the effect of delay on college re-enrollment by including high 
school graduates. However, this definition may unnecessarily overestimate the delaying effect by 
including the students who never planned to enroll. Second, due to the limitation of the data, the 
external validity of my research is subject to the cohorts of the two datasets I use. Furthermore, 
my study cannot answer the question of how delaying length affects academic and employment 
outcomes, let alone the heterogeneous effects caused by different activities during the gap year. 
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Appendix A: Theoretical Model 
My theoretical model is built based on Dellas and Sakellaris (2003)’s model on the 
cyclicality of schooling. In order to analyze the factors affecting college enrollment decision, I 
develop a human capital investment function whose object is to maximize the net present value 
of life-long earning. Assume at time 0, all high school graduates face two options: attending 
college or working until 𝑡଴. Regardless of his/her postponement decision, a student needs 𝑐 years 
to receive a bachelor degree. Accordingly, a student entering college immediately starts to earn 
bachelor degree wage income 𝑤ଵ from year 𝑐, or 𝑤ଵ(𝑐). For the student who choose to delay 
enrollment till 𝑡଴, he/she earns high school degree wage 𝑤଴ from time 0, or 𝑤଴(0). He/she re-
enters the labor market at 𝑡଴ + 𝑐 after completing postsecondary education and the college 
degree wage is 𝑤ଵ(𝑡଴ + 𝑐). In both situations, one retires at T. 𝑟 represents the discount rate. To 




𝑌 = 𝑉[𝑤଴(0), 𝑡଴, 𝑟] − 𝑉[𝑔, (𝑡଴ + 𝑐), 𝑟] + 𝑉[𝑤ଵ(𝑡଴ + 𝑐), (𝑇 − 𝑡଴ − 𝑐), 𝑟] −
𝑉[𝑤ଵ(𝑐), (𝑇 − 𝑐) , 𝑟] + 𝑉[𝑔, 𝑐, 𝑟].             (1) 
In equation (1), the lifetime wealth is determined by the subtraction of the total utility of 
delay and the total utility of not delay. The former is constituted of 𝑉[𝑤଴(0), 𝑡଴, 𝑟], the utility 
received from working as a high school graduate from time 0 to 𝑡଴, −𝑉[𝑔, (𝑡଴ + 𝑐), 𝑟] , the 
utility of the tuition cost, and 𝑉[𝑤ଵ(𝑡଴ + 𝑐), (𝑇 − 𝑡଴ − 𝑐), 𝑟], the utility received from earning 
after one graduates from college at 𝑡଴ + 𝑐. The latter contains 𝑉[𝑤ଵ(𝑐), (𝑇 − 𝑐) , 𝑟], the utility 
lost from not enrolling college at time 0, and − 𝑉[𝑔, 𝑐, 𝑟], the utility of the tuition cost. To 
maximize the wealth, I take the first order condition for this function, 
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𝜕{𝑉[𝑤଴(0), 𝑡଴, 𝑟] − 𝑉[𝑔, (𝑡଴ + 𝑐), 𝑟] + 𝑉[𝑤ଵ(𝑡଴ + 𝑐), (𝑇 − 𝑡଴ − 𝑐), 𝑟]}
𝜕𝑡଴
−
𝜕{𝑉[𝑤ଵ(𝑐), (𝑇 − 𝑐) , 𝑟] − 𝑉[𝑔, 𝑐, 𝑟]}
𝜕𝑡଴
= 0                            (2) 
I decompose 𝑉[𝑤ଵ(𝑐), (𝑇 − 𝑐) , 𝑟] to two parts by the time of attending college 𝑡଴, 
𝑉[𝑤ଵ(𝑐), 𝑡଴ , 𝑟] and 𝑉[𝑤ଵ(𝑐), (𝑇 − 𝑡଴ − 𝑐) , 𝑟]. If assume that students have no ability to predict 
the college wage change,  𝑤ଵ can be seen the same regardless of the graduation time, 𝑤ଵ(𝑐) =
𝑤ଵ(𝑡଴ + 𝑐).  We have the new equation,  
∂{𝑉[𝑤ଵ(𝑐), 𝑡଴ , 𝑟]}
𝜕𝑡଴
=
∂ {𝑉[𝑔, 𝑐, 𝑟] − 𝑉[𝑔, (𝑡଴ + 𝑐), 𝑟] + 𝑉[𝑤଴(0), 𝑡଴, 𝑟]}
𝜕𝑡଴
. (3) 
The left side of equation (3) now is the marginal cost of delaying college entrance – deferring the 
college payoff for one additional year. The right side represents the marginal benefit to college 
delay – the deferred tuition and the wage earned immediately after high school graduation. The 





Appendix B: Appendix Figures and Tables 
Table A1. The Effect of Change in Number of Building Permits on Other Outcomes 
 
 


















                  
Change in Number of 
Permits of New Housing 
Unit, 2001 (in hundreds) -0.0958 -75.4605* -44.8420 -25.7767 0.0001 -0.0026** 0.0007 0.0006 
 (0.0798) (40.1164) (34.2989) (40.5249) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0007) (0.0007) 
Hispanic 0.8001 -407.3253 -655.9340 64.2182 0.1070*** -0.0538* -0.0037 0.0612** 
 (1.4672) (1,571.0288) (1,560.3452) (1,751.3552) (0.0324) (0.0302) (0.0311) (0.0294) 
Black 2.3639 1,038.2851 3,120.5236** 4,354.3466** 0.0491 0.0298 -0.0598** 0.1058*** 
 (1.5555) (1,531.8081) (1,524.0550) (1,705.3469) (0.0316) (0.0315) (0.0292) (0.0301) 
SES Quartile -1.4902*** 2,056.5155*** 2,311.9937*** 2,357.7431*** -0.0008 0.0071 0.0334*** 0.0179** 
 (0.3783) (472.9768) (466.7096) (523.3042) (0.0085) (0.0079) (0.0085) (0.0084) 
Math Ability Quartile -0.4317 3,807.3648*** 3,310.2750*** 3,044.8459*** 0.0008 -0.0056 -0.0013 0.0673*** 
 (0.3330) (367.9669) (334.7041) (376.4497) (0.0075) (0.0069) (0.0076) (0.0071) 
Parental Education 1.7376* 1,470.0752* 63.6704 -172.1846 -0.0206 0.0105 -0.0275 0.0520*** 
 (0.9799) (866.0166) (860.3516) (934.7766) (0.0208) (0.0185) (0.0191) (0.0200) 
County Level Covariates2 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
State Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
N 2,217 6,216 5,619 5,619 5,185 5,185 5,185 6,216 
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Table A2. OLS Estimates and TSLS Estimates of Effect of Not Enrolling Immediately on Female 
College Attendance in 8 Years 
Dependent Variable is Female College Attendance by the Third Follow-up in 2012 
  OLS OLS TSLS TSLS 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Not enroll immediately 1 -0.3586*** -0.3584*** 0.9065 2.4680 
  (0.0081) (0.0081) (1.2659) (8.0695) 
Black 0.0469*** 0.0487*** 0.0499** 0.0459 
  (0.0096) (0.0101) (0.0208) (0.0445) 
SES quartile 0.0135*** 0.0137*** 0.1224 0.2532 
  (0.0041) (0.0041) (0.1089) (0.6828) 
Math ability quartile 0.0242*** 0.0238*** 0.1953 0.4067 
  (0.0036) (0.0036) (0.1714) (1.0936) 
Parental Education 0.0393*** 0.0395*** 0.0919 0.1569 
  (0.0096) (0.0097) (0.0579) (0.3421) 
County Level Covariates2 Y Y Y Y 
State Fixed Effects  Y  Y 
N           6,880              6,880              6,870               6,870  
Note: This table reports OLS and TSLS estimates of not enrolling immediately for the ELS2002 
sample having valid geographic information and college attendance information.  
1. Students who did not enroll in college by 2004 are defined as delayers. 
2. County Level Covariates include population size, unemployment rate, and urbanity index. 





Table A3. Employment Change in the Construction Sector Using Change in Permits of New 
Housing Units in 2001 as a proxy 
Dependent Variable: Over-the-year Change in Employment in the Construction Sector, 2003  
  (1) (2) 





  (3.5272) (3.5125) 
First-stage F-statistics 42.05 7.77 
R2 0.0714 0.1373 
County Level Covariates Y Y 
State Fixed Effects   Y 
N 2,742 2,742 
Data Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics and Building Permit Survey 
Note: This table reports the OLS results for all matched 2,742 counties, who have valid information on 
construction employment in BLS.  
* Statistically significant at the .1 level; ** at the .05 level; ***at the .01 level. 





Table A4. Falsification Test: First Stage for Percentage Change in/Total Employment in the 
Construction Using Percentage Change in/Total Permits of New Housing Units in 2001 as 
Instrument Variable 
Panel A: Dependent Variable: Over-the-year Percentage Change in Employment 
in the Construction Sector, 2003  
  (1) (2) 
Percentage Change in Number of Permits of 
New Housing Unit, 2001 0.2090 0.2095 
  (0.4508) (0.4534) 
First-stage F-statistics 11.20 2.77 
R2 0.021 0.0560 
County Level Covariates Y Y 
State Fixed Effects  Y 
N 2,621 2,621 
Data Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics and Building Permit Survey 
Note: This table reports the OLS results for all matched 2,621 counties, who have 
valid information on construction employment in BLS and have issued at least 
one building permit in 2000.   
* Statistically significant at the .1 level; ** at the .05 level; ***at the .01 level. 
 
Panel B: Dependent Variable: Total Employment in the Construction Sector, 2003 
  (1) (2) 
Total Number of Permits of New Housing Unit, 
2001 (in hundreds) 218.4244*** 222.5511*** 
  (3.8676) (4.0015) 
First-stage F-statistics 6831.10 633.00 
R2 0.9258 0.9284 
County Level Covariates Y Y 
State Fixed Effects   Y 
N 2,742 2,742 
Data Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics and Building Permit Survey 
Note: This table reports the OLS results for all matched 2,742 counties, who have 
valid information on construction employment in BLS.  






Table A5. Falsification Test: Using 2-year or 1-year Leaded Permit Change as Instrument 
Dependent Variable is Not Immediately Enroll in College1 














          
Change in Number of 
Permits of New Housing 
Unit (in hundreds) 0.0007 0.0012 0.0013*** 0.0011 
  (0.0007) (0.0009) (0.0004) (0.0008) 
Black -0.0108 -0.0042 -0.0099 -0.0043 
  (0.0181) (0.0189) (0.0181) (0.0189) 
SES Quartile -0.1071*** -0.1080*** -0.1071*** -0.1080*** 
  (0.0081) (0.0079) (0.0080) (0.00786) 
Math Ability Quartile -0.1313*** -0.1313*** -0.1302*** -0.1313*** 
  (0.0068) (0.0069) (0.0068) (0.0069) 
Parental Education -0.0202 -0.0224 -0.0199 -0.0222 
  (0.0185) (0.0186) (0.0185) (0.0186) 
County Level Covariates Y Y Y Y 
State Fixed Effects   Y   Y 
N 6,420 6,420 6,420 6,420 
Data Source: Education Longitudinal Survey: 2002 restricted-use data 
1. Students who did not enroll in college by 2004 are defined as delayers. 
2. County Level Covariates include population size, unemployment rate, and 
urbanity index. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses     
* Statistically significant at the .1 level; ** at the .05 level; ***at the .01 level. 






Multinomial Regression Analysis: Potential Determinants of the Length of Delay 
 Delayed 
Delayed 








     
Black -0.526*** -0.193 -0.214 -0.411** -0.874*** 
 [0.088] [0.125] [0.174] [0.196] [0.110] 
Hispanic -0.250** -0.014 0.051 -0.502** -0.470*** 
 [0.101] [0.139] [0.207] [0.252] [0.126] 
Other race (except White) -0.181* -0.026 -0.246 0.148 -0.346*** 
 [0.106] [0.143] [0.220] [0.251] [0.132] 
Female -0.505*** -0.255*** -0.429*** -0.430*** -0.711*** 
 [0.064] [0.091] [0.132] [0.151] [0.080] 
Birth year -0.130** -0.038 0.075 -0.039 -0.241*** 
 [0.051] [0.073] [0.100] [0.109] [0.060] 
High school graduation year -0.004 -0.054 -0.246 -0.266* 0.135 
 [0.073] [0.098] [0.153] [0.153] [0.088] 
Lived in urban area in 1997 -0.033 0.207* 0.053 0.011 -0.220** 
 [0.078] [0.117] [0.162] [0.184] [0.095] 
Lived in Northeast region in 1997 0.488 0.422 1.235* 0.67 0.305 
 [0.357] [0.484] [0.701] [0.789] [0.420] 
Lived in North Central region in 1997 -0.056 -0.558 0.468 -0.985 0.174 
 [0.309] [0.466] [0.664] [0.916] [0.360] 
Lived in Southern region in 1997 0.409 0.108 1.314** -0.018 0.365  
[0.287] [0.401] [0.603] [0.736] [0.340] 
Lived in metropolitan area in 1997 -0.313*** -0.174 -0.449*** -0.485** -0.341*** 
 [0.088] [0.131] [0.172] [0.190] [0.107] 
Household demographics 
     
Household size 0.040* 0.032 0.018 0.085* 0.045* 
 [0.022] [0.030] [0.042] [0.045] [0.026] 
Highest year of parental education -0.123*** -0.079*** -0.064** -0.086*** -0.179*** 
 [0.012] [0.017] [0.025] [0.029] [0.015] 
Household net worth in 1997 (thousands) -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.001* -0.002** -0.002*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] 
Household income in high school graduation  -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.003*** 
year (thousands) [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.001] 
Lived with both parents in high school  -0.324*** -0.273*** -0.382*** -0.828*** -0.264*** 





Table A3 (cont.) 








> 7 Years 
Never 
Enrolled 
High school characteristics      
Public school 0.892*** 0.681*** 1.320** 1.728** 0.852***  
[0.186] [0.261] [0.524] [0.732] [0.257] 
< 299 students 0.154 0.014 0.196 0.312 0.2  
[0.143] [0.216] [0.282] [0.327] [0.175] 
300–499 students -0.128 -0.094 -0.433* 0.088 -0.131 
 
[0.120] [0.177] [0.262] [0.266] [0.147] 
500–749 students 0.039 0.182 -0.153 -0.14 0.023 
 
[0.093] [0.128] [0.191] [0.220] [0.115] 
750–999 students -0.009 -0.141 0.018 -0.291 0.107 
 
[0.095] [0.140] [0.187] [0.235] [0.115] 
Pupil–teacher ratio < 14 -0.261** -0.453*** -0.171 -0.461* -0.114 
 
[0.105] [0.149] [0.212] [0.239] [0.130] 
Pupil–teacher ratio 14 to < 18 -0.121 -0.230* -0.162 -0.113 -0.031 
 
[0.090] [0.125] [0.184] [0.200] [0.113] 
Pupil–teacher ratio 18 to < 22 -0.113 -0.163 -0.038 -0.564** -0.026 
 
[0.093] [0.127] [0.184] [0.227] [0.115] 
Academic preparation      
High school GPA -1.307*** -0.993*** -1.380*** -1.715*** -1.482*** 
 
[0.079] [0.106] [0.149] [0.168] [0.097] 
ASVAB score percentile  -0.019*** -0.008*** -0.010*** -0.014*** -0.031*** 
 
[0.001] [0.002] [0.003] [0.003] [0.002] 
Other characteristics      
Married or cohabiting in high school 0.865*** 0.479** 0.660*** 0.998*** 1.128*** 
graduation year [0.136] [0.192] [0.241] [0.247] [0.156] 
Pregnant/got someone pregnant in high school 0.583*** 0.463** 0.949*** 0.815*** 0.501*** 
graduation year [0.136] [0.181] [0.219] [0.238] [0.160] 
Number of children  0.683*** 0.749*** 0.822*** 0.853*** 0.560*** 
 
[0.153] [0.189] [0.221] [0.235] [0.174] 
Health condition in high school graduation year -0.167*** -0.131*** -0.109 -0.068 -0.219*** 
(5 = excellent) [0.036] [0.050] [0.071] [0.079] [0.043] 
Arrests in high school graduation year 0.422*** 0.397*** 0.403*** 0.446*** 0.445***  
[0.119] [0.134] [0.141] [0.139] [0.124] 
Ever drank alcohol 0.01 0.121 -0.074 -0.003 -0.031 
  [0.069] [0.099] [0.139] [0.157] [0.085] 
Year * region interaction Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 




Balance Check: Summary Statistics by Treatment Status  




Mean  % reduction  t-test 
Treatment Control  % bias |bias|  t p > |t| 
Black Unmatched 0.2733 0.19872  17.6   7.05 0 
 
Matched 0.2734 0.27347  0 99.9  -0.01 0.996 
Hispanic Unmatched 0.23168 0.16422  17   6.81 0 
 
Matched 0.23143 0.26116  -7.5 55.9  -2.53 0.011 
Other race (except White) Unmatched 0.14328 0.12062  6.7   2.67 0.008 
 
Matched 0.14339 0.15831  -4.4 34.1  -1.53 0.126 
Female Unmatched 0.44862 0.55068  -20.5   -8.14 0 
 
Matched 0.44874 0.45007  -0.3 98.7  -0.1 0.922 
Birth year 1980 Unmatched 0.19705 0.17892  4.6   1.85 0.065 
 
Matched 0.19651 0.20519  -2.2 52.1  -0.8 0.426 
Birth year 1981 Unmatched 0.21768 0.20781  2.4   0.96 0.338 
 
Matched 0.21842 0.21464  0.9 61.6  0.34 0.736 
Birth year 1982 Unmatched 0.21657 0.20112  3.8   1.51 0.131 
 
Matched 0.21582 0.22118  -1.3 65.4  -0.48 0.635 
Birth year 1983 Unmatched 0.19374 0.20433  -2.7   -1.05 0.293 
 
Matched 0.19354 0.18418  2.3 11.7  0.88 0.381 
Birth year 1984 Unmatched 0.17495 0.20781  -8.4   -3.3 0.001 
 
Matched 0.17571 0.17481  0.2 97.3  0.09 0.931 
High school graduation year Unmatched 2000.5 2000.4  6.6   2.62 0.009 
 
Matched 2000.5 2000.5  3.2 51.1  1.2 0.23 
Household size Unmatched 4.5871 4.4204  11.4   4.59 0 
 
Matched 4.5806 4.5871  -0.4 96.1  -0.15 0.878 
Highest years of parental  Unmatched 12.49 14.327  -64.3   -25.38 0 
education Matched 12.501 12.382  4.1 93.6  1.47 0.143 
Household net worth in 1997 Unmatched 48.095 104.06  -43.4   -16.62 0 
(thousands) Matched 48.335 47.897  0.3 99.2  0.17 0.864 
Household income in high school Unmatched 29.569 47.235  -32   -12.31 0 
graduation year (thousands) Matched 29.658 29.58  0.1 99.6  0.07 0.947 
Attended public high school Unmatched 0.6954 0.71356  -4   -1.58 0.114 
 
Matched 0.69428 0.69318  0.2 93.9  0.09 0.93 
Lived in urban area in 1997 Unmatched 0.71455 0.73014  -3.5   -1.38 0.167 
 
Matched 0.71471 0.73394  -4.3 -23.4  -1.58 0.114 
Lived in Northeast in 1997 Unmatched 0.16538 0.18374  -4.8   -1.91 0.056 
 
Matched 0.16493 0.16152  0.9 81.4  0.34 0.735 
Lived in North Central region in Unmatched 0.22983 0.25568  -6   -2.38 0.017 
1997 Matched 0.22994 0.21742  2.9 51.6  1.1 0.27 
Lived in South in 1997 Unmatched 0.36759 0.33779  6.2   2.48 0.013 
 
Matched 0.36887 0.35288  3.3 46.3  1.22 0.222 
Lived in metropolitan area in Unmatched 0.79153 0.84194  -13.1   -5.22 0 
1997 Matched 0.79309 0.81495  -5.7 56.6  -2.02 0.043 
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Table A4 (cont.) 
Balance Check: Summary Statistics by Treatment Status  




Mean  % reduction  t-test 
Treatment Control  % bias |bias|  t p > |t| 
School size < 299 students Unmatched 0.06041 0.0698  -3.8   -1.5 0.133  
Matched 0.05944 0.05349  2.4 36.7  0.95 0.345 
School size 300–499 students Unmatched 0.09576 0.10538  -3.2   -1.26 0.207  
Matched 0.0951 0.0982  -1 67.7  -0.39 0.7 
School size 500–749 students Unmatched 0.19558 0.20059  -1.3   -0.5 0.619  
Matched 0.19651 0.19855  -0.5 59.2  -0.19 0.851 
School size 750–999 students Unmatched 0.16317 0.15245  2.9   1.17 0.243  
Matched 0.16382 0.1628  0.3 90.5  0.1 0.92 
Pupil–teacher ratio < 14 Unmatched 0.20884 0.23723  -6.8   -2.7 0.007  
Matched 0.20951 0.20916  0.1 98.8  0.03 0.975 
Pupil teacher ratio 14 to < 18 Unmatched 0.32486 0.33271  -1.7   -0.66 0.508  
Matched 0.32281 0.30543  3.7 -121.5  1.37 0.17 
Pupil teacher ratio 18 to < 22 Unmatched 0.20958 0.20647  0.8   0.3 0.762 
 Matched 0.20951 0.20531  1 -35.2  0.38 0.704 
High school GPA Unmatched 1.831 2.4209  -44.7   -17.63 0  
Matched 1.8349 1.8373  -0.2 99.6  -0.07 0.943 
ASVAB score percentile Unmatched 30.002 51.463  -71.5   -27.99 0  
Matched 30.155 30.541  -1.3 98.2  -0.52 0.6 
Lived with both parents in  Unmatched 0.46262 0.63359  -34.9   -13.87 0 
high school graduation year Matched 0.46397 0.46543  -0.3 99.1  -0.11 0.914 
Married or cohabiting in Unmatched 0.10424 0.03076  29.6   12.25 0 
high school graduation year Matched 0.09955 0.09241  2.9 90.3  0.89 0.374 
Pregnant/got someone pregnant  Unmatched 0.1046 0.03183  29.2   12.06 0 
in high school graduation year Matched 0.10067 0.09859  0.8 97.1  0.26 0.799 
Ever had a child Unmatched 0.08287 0.01658  30.9   12.92 0  
Matched 0.07875 0.07183  3.2 89.6  0.96 0.336 
Health condition in high school  Unmatched 3.6243 3.9874  -31.5   -12.65 0 
graduation year (5 = excellent) Matched 3.6282 3.6264  0.2 99.5  0.05 0.959 
Ever arrested Unmatched 0.05267 0.02728  13   5.28 0  
Matched 0.05052 0.04986  0.3 97.4  0.11 0.912 
Ever drank alcohol Unmatched 0.56022 0.64643  -17.7   -7.04 0  
Matched 0.56092 0.54866  2.5 85.8  0.9 0.366 
Household income missing Unmatched 0.35617 0.36266  -1.4   -0.54 0.592  
Matched 0.3581 0.36858  -2.2 -61.4  -0.8 0.424 
Public vs. private high school 
attendance missing Unmatched 0.28766 0.21423  17   6.79 0  
Matched 0.28863 0.28709  0.4 97.9  0.13 0.901 
High school GPA missing Unmatched 0.30018 0.22038  18.3   7.3 0  
Matched 0.30163 0.2994  0.5 97.2  0.18 0.858 
ASVAB score percentile missing Unmatched 0.1989 0.15218  12.3   4.92 0  
Matched 0.19948 0.19694  0.7 94.6  0.23 0.815 
Health condition in high school 
missing Unmatched 0.09797 0.04306  21.6   8.81 0  





Effects of Delay on College Enrollment by Year, OLS and PSM 
 OLS  PSM 
Outcomes Coefficient SE  Coefficient SE 
Panel A: Ever enrolled in college by… 
1 year after high school completion -0.844*** (0.00821)  -0.872*** (0.00646) 
2 years after high school completion -0.744*** (0.00966)  -0.785*** (0.00791) 
3 years after high school completion -0.685*** (0.0102)  -0.735*** (0.00849) 
4 years after high school completion -0.651*** (0.0104)  -0.703*** (0.00877) 
5 years after high school completion -0.617*** (0.0105)  -0.671*** (0.00900) 
6 years after high school completion -0.583*** (0.0106)  -0.639*** (0.00918) 
7 years after high school completion -0.557*** (0.0106)  -0.614*** (0.00930) 
8 years after high school completion -0.532*** (0.0106)  -0.587*** (0.00940) 
9 years after high school completion -0.515*** (0.0105)  -0.570*** (0.00944) 
10 years after high school completion -0.504*** (0.0105)  -0.558*** (0.00948) 
11 years after high school completion -0.493*** (0.0105)  -0.547*** (0.00950) 
12 years after high school completion -0.480*** (0.0105)  -0.534*** (0.00951) 
13 years after high school completion -0.473*** (0.0104)  -0.527*** (0.00952) 
Panel B: Ever enrolled in a four-year college by… 
1 year after high school completion -0.453*** (0.0112)  -0.387*** (0.0133) 
2 years after high school completion -0.458*** (0.0119)  -0.402*** (0.0141) 
3 years after high school completion -0.455*** (0.0123)  -0.407*** (0.0145) 
4 years after high school completion -0.458*** (0.0126)  -0.417*** (0.0150) 
5 years after high school completion -0.455*** (0.0127)  -0.418*** (0.0151) 
6 years after high school completion -0.447*** (0.0129)  -0.414*** (0.0152) 
7 years after high school completion -0.438*** (0.0130)  -0.406*** (0.0154) 
8 years after high school completion -0.428*** (0.0131)  -0.396*** (0.0155) 
9 years after high school completion -0.422*** (0.0132)  -0.389*** (0.0156) 
10 years after high school completion -0.416*** (0.0132)  -0.383*** (0.0157) 
11 years after high school completion -0.413*** (0.0133)  -0.382*** (0.0158) 
12 years after high school completion -0.409*** (0.0133)  -0.377*** (0.0158) 
13 years after high school completion -0.407*** (0.0133)  -0.375*** (0.0158) 
Panel C: Ever enrolled in a two-year college by… 
1 year after high school completion -0.454*** (0.0119)  -0.523*** (0.0141) 
2 years after high school completion -0.408*** (0.0130)  -0.484*** (0.0146) 
3 years after high school completion -0.389*** (0.0134)  -0.462*** (0.0148) 
4 years after high school completion -0.375*** (0.0136)  -0.448*** (0.0149) 
5 years after high school completion -0.357*** (0.0137)  -0.433*** (0.0148) 
6 years after high school completion -0.334*** (0.0140)  -0.411*** (0.0149) 
7 years after high school completion -0.321*** (0.0141)  -0.400*** (0.0149) 
8 years after high school completion -0.304*** (0.0142)  -0.381*** (0.0150) 
9 years after high school completion -0.292*** (0.0142)  -0.370*** (0.0149) 
10 years after high school completion -0.284*** (0.0143)  -0.362*** (0.0149) 
11 years after high school completion -0.277*** (0.0143)  -0.354*** (0.0149) 
12 years after high school completion -0.268*** (0.0143)  -0.345*** (0.0150) 
13 years after high school completion -0.267*** (0.0143)  -0.345*** (0.0149) 





Effects of Delay on Degree Completion by Year, OLS and PSM 
 OLS  PSM 
Outcomes Coefficient SE  Coefficient SE 
Panel A: Ever received a college degree by… 
2 years after high school completion -0.0230*** (0.00400) -0.0252*** (0.00501) 
3 years after high school completion -0.0836*** (0.00677) -0.0850*** (0.00892) 
4 years after high school completion -0.195*** (0.00988) -0.181*** (0.0116) 
5 years after high school completion -0.274*** (0.0116) -0.247*** (0.0133) 
6 years after high school completion -0.315*** (0.0122) -0.287*** (0.0142) 
7 years after high school completion -0.332*** (0.0128) -0.309*** (0.0148) 
8 years after high school completion -0.334*** (0.0131) -0.314*** (0.0152) 
9 years after high school completion -0.340*** (0.0133) -0.326*** (0.0156) 
10 years after high school completion -0.336*** (0.0135) -0.326*** (0.0159) 
11 years after high school completion -0.329*** (0.0136) -0.322*** (0.0161) 
12 years after high school completion -0.320*** (0.0138) -0.314*** (0.0162) 
13 years after high school completion -0.318*** (0.0138) -0.318*** (0.0162) 
Panel B: Ever received a bachelor’s degree by… 
4 years after high school completion -0.0959*** (0.00671) -0.0714*** (0.00574) 
5 years after high school completion -0.171*** (0.00869) -0.126*** (0.00771) 
6 years after high school completion -0.214*** (0.00957) -0.166*** (0.00930) 
7 years after high school completion -0.240*** (0.0102) -0.190*** (0.0102) 
8 years after high school completion -0.259*** (0.0107) -0.209*** (0.0110) 
9 years after high school completion -0.266*** (0.0110) -0.217*** (0.0116) 
10 years after high school completion -0.269*** (0.0112) -0.219*** (0.0119) 
11 years after high school completion -0.271*** (0.0114) -0.221*** (0.0121) 
12 years after high school completion -0.271*** (0.0116) -0.220*** (0.0123) 
13 years after high school completion -0.272*** (0.0118) -0.221*** (0.0125) 
Panel C: Ever received an associate degree by… 
2 years after high school completion -0.0217*** (0.00396) -0.0246*** (0.00500) 
3 years after high school completion -0.0730*** (0.00642) -0.0777*** (0.00866) 
4 years after high school completion -0.109*** (0.00836) -0.118*** (0.0107) 
5 years after high school completion -0.126*** (0.00972) -0.137*** (0.0120) 
6 years after high school completion -0.140*** (0.0105) -0.155*** (0.0130) 
7 years after high school completion -0.140*** (0.0113) -0.161*** (0.0137) 
8 years after high school completion -0.139*** (0.0118) -0.161*** (0.0141) 
9 years after high school completion -0.143*** (0.0122) -0.168*** (0.0147) 
10 years after high school completion -0.141*** (0.0126) -0.172*** (0.0151) 
11 years after high school completion -0.137*** (0.0129) -0.170*** (0.0154) 
12 years after high school completion -0.130*** (0.0132) -0.164*** (0.0156) 
13 years after high school completion -0.129*** (0.0134) -0.171*** (0.0158) 





Effects of Delay on Labor Market Outcomes, OLS and PSM 
 OLS  PSM 
Outcomes Coefficient SE  Coefficient SE 
Panel A: Income (adjusted $2010) 
1st year after high school completion 2,309*** (277.1)  2,094*** (340.0) 
2nd year after high school completion 2,462*** (344.9)  2,097*** (383.8) 
3rd year after high school completion 1,443*** (416.3)  871.7* (480.8) 
4th year after high school completion -9.650 (458.6)  -704.3 (560.8) 
5th year after high school completion -1,507*** (504.1)  -1,961*** (603.4) 
6th year after high school completion -3,131*** (544.0)  -2,836*** (591.3) 
7th year after high school completion -4,933*** (580.1)  -3,814*** (634.1) 
8th year after high school completion -6,116*** (638.7)  -5,046*** (677.8) 
9th year after high school completion -6,266*** (678.4)  -4,915*** (698.2) 
10th year after high school completion -7,285*** (729.0)  -6,208*** (803.4) 
11th year after high school completion -7,864*** (783.7)  -6,818*** (881.3) 
12th year after high school completion -8,224*** (835.2)  -7,048*** (924.5) 
13th year after high school completion -8,596*** (917.3)  -7,470*** (978.4) 
Panel B: Total work hours 
1st year after high school completion 223.4*** (22.50)  222.7*** (25.72) 
2nd year after high school completion 223.5*** (26.46)  196.2*** (30.37) 
3rd year after high school completion 131.7*** (28.34)  111.6*** (33.81) 
4th year after high school completion 112.9*** (29.62)  63.46* (34.95) 
5th year after high school completion -26.94 (29.78)  -65.66* (36.53) 
6th year after high school completion -112.1*** (29.70)  -117.6*** (34.19) 
7th year after high school completion -212.7*** (30.58)  -230.3*** (37.96) 
8th year after high school completion -259.1*** (30.77)  -247.0*** (36.89) 
9th year after high school completion -259.0*** (30.76)  -225.0*** (35.57) 
10th year after high school completion -257.7*** (31.92)  -229.0*** (37.40) 
11th year after high school completion -250.6*** (32.30)  -228.8*** (37.93) 
12th year after high school completion -229.9*** (33.30)  -184.5*** (39.75) 
13th year after high school completion -237.0*** (33.91)  -202.2*** (40.46) 
Panel C: Full-time work status (> 35 hours/week for 50 weeks) 
1st year after high school completion 0.0605*** (0.0091)  0.0493*** (0.0104) 
2nd year after high school completion 0.0823*** (0.0114)  0.0728*** (0.0129) 
3rd year after high school completion 0.0622*** (0.0126)  0.0505*** (0.0142) 
4th year after high school completion 0.0710*** (0.0132)  0.0525*** (0.0147) 
5th year after high school completion 0.0412*** (0.0136)  0.0225 (0.0156) 
6th year after high school completion -0.0216 (0.0140)  -0.0180 (0.0158) 
7th year after high school completion -0.0742*** (0.0144)  -0.0810*** (0.0165) 
8th year after high school completion -0.0805*** (0.0144)  -0.0797*** (0.0164) 
9th year after high school completion -0.105*** (0.0145)  -0.0980*** (0.0166) 
10th year after high school completion -0.0897*** (0.0145)  -0.0916*** (0.0166) 
11th year after high school completion -0.0943*** (0.0146)  -0.0957*** (0.0166) 
12th year after high school completion -0.0803*** (0.0142)  -0.0666*** (0.0161) 
13th year after high school completion -0.0726*** (0.0135)  -0.0641*** (0.0156) 
Note. NLSY97 follow-up surveys were not conducted annually after 2011. We imputed the labor market outcomes for 2012 and 
2014 by averaging the outcomes from the years immediately before and after.  




Effects of Delay on College Enrollment by Year, Restricted to “Thick Support” Sample 
  OLS  PSM 
Outcomes Coefficient SE  Coefficient SE 
Panel A: Ever enrolled in college by… 
1 year after high school completion -0.844*** (0.00821)  -0.827*** (0.0103) 
2 years after high school completion -0.744*** (0.00966)  -0.713*** (0.0123) 
3 years after high school completion -0.685*** (0.0102)  -0.644*** (0.0130) 
4 years after high school completion -0.651*** (0.0104)  -0.607*** (0.0132) 
5 years after high school completion -0.617*** (0.0105)  -0.569*** (0.0134) 
6 years after high school completion -0.583*** (0.0106)  -0.532*** (0.0134) 
7 years after high school completion -0.557*** (0.0106)  -0.510*** (0.0134) 
8 years after high school completion -0.532*** (0.0106)  -0.487*** (0.0134) 
9 years after high school completion -0.515*** (0.0105)  -0.469*** (0.0134) 
10 years after high school completion -0.504*** (0.0105)  -0.458*** (0.0134) 
11 years after high school completion -0.493*** (0.0105)  -0.447*** (0.0133) 
12 years after high school completion -0.480*** (0.0105)  -0.432*** (0.0133) 
13 years after high school completion -0.473*** (0.0104)  -0.424*** (0.0133) 
Panel B: Ever enrolled in a four-year college by… 
1 year after high school completion -0.453*** (0.0112)  -0.482*** (0.0138) 
2 years after high school completion -0.458*** (0.0119)  -0.482*** (0.0148) 
3 years after high school completion -0.455*** (0.0123)  -0.470*** (0.0154) 
4 years after high school completion -0.458*** (0.0126)  -0.460*** (0.0158) 
5 years after high school completion -0.455*** (0.0127)  -0.454*** (0.0160) 
6 years after high school completion -0.447*** (0.0129)  -0.443*** (0.0163) 
7 years after high school completion -0.438*** (0.0130)  -0.431*** (0.0164) 
8 years after high school completion -0.428*** (0.0131)  -0.421*** (0.0167) 
9 years after high school completion -0.422*** (0.0132)  -0.414*** (0.0167) 
10 years after high school completion -0.416*** (0.0132)  -0.406*** (0.0168) 
11 years after high school completion -0.413*** (0.0133)  -0.402*** (0.0169) 
12 years after high school completion -0.409*** (0.0133)  -0.399*** (0.0169) 
13 years after high school completion -0.407*** (0.0133)  -0.399*** (0.0169) 
Panel C: Ever enrolled in a two-year college by… 
1 year after high school completion -0.454*** (0.0119)  -0.417*** (0.0146) 
2 years after high school completion -0.408*** (0.0130)  -0.362*** (0.0160) 
3 years after high school completion -0.389*** (0.0134)  -0.339*** (0.0165) 
4 years after high school completion -0.375*** (0.0136)  -0.320*** (0.0168) 
5 years after high school completion -0.357*** (0.0137)  -0.295*** (0.0172) 
6 years after high school completion -0.334*** (0.0140)  -0.272*** (0.0174) 
7 years after high school completion -0.321*** (0.0141)  -0.262*** (0.0175) 
8 years after high school completion -0.304*** (0.0142)  -0.244*** (0.0177) 
9 years after high school completion -0.292*** (0.0142)  -0.231*** (0.0177) 
10 years after high school completion -0.284*** (0.0143)  -0.222*** (0.0178) 
11 years after high school completion -0.277*** (0.0143)  -0.212*** (0.0178) 
12 years after high school completion -0.268*** (0.0143)  -0.203*** (0.0178) 
13 years after high school completion -0.267*** (0.0143)   -0.203*** (0.0178) 





Effects of Delay on Degree Completion by Year, Restricted to “Thick Support” Sample 
  OLS  PSM 
Outcomes Coefficient SE  Coefficient SE 
Panel A: Ever received a college degree by… 
2 years after high school completion -0.0230*** (0.00400)  -0.0195*** (0.00473) 
3 years after high school completion -0.0836*** (0.00677)  -0.0704*** (0.00770) 
4 years after high school completion -0.195*** (0.00988)  -0.195*** (0.0116) 
5 years after high school completion -0.274*** (0.0116)  -0.286*** (0.0142) 
6 years after high school completion -0.315*** (0.0122)  -0.320*** (0.0152) 
7 years after high school completion -0.332*** (0.0128)  -0.331*** (0.0161) 
8 years after high school completion -0.334*** (0.0131)  -0.333*** (0.0166) 
9 years after high school completion -0.340*** (0.0133)  -0.336*** (0.0169) 
10 years after high school completion -0.336*** (0.0135)  -0.326*** (0.0171) 
11 years after high school completion -0.329*** (0.0136)  -0.318*** (0.0173) 
12 years after high school completion -0.320*** (0.0138)  -0.307*** (0.0174) 
13 years after high school completion -0.318*** (0.0138)  -0.300*** (0.0174) 
Panel B: Ever received a bachelor’s degree by… 
4 years after high school completion -0.0959*** (0.00671)  -0.113*** (0.00763) 
5 years after high school completion -0.171*** (0.00869)  -0.202*** (0.0104) 
6 years after high school completion -0.214*** (0.00957)  -0.239*** (0.0115) 
7 years after high school completion -0.240*** (0.0102)  -0.264*** (0.0125) 
8 years after high school completion -0.259*** (0.0107)  -0.280*** (0.0131) 
9 years after high school completion -0.266*** (0.0110)  -0.286*** (0.0134) 
10 years after high school completion -0.269*** (0.0112)  -0.289*** (0.0138) 
11 years after high school completion -0.271*** (0.0114)  -0.292*** (0.0142) 
12 years after high school completion -0.271*** (0.0116)  -0.290*** (0.0144) 
13 years after high school completion -0.272*** (0.0118)  -0.291*** (0.0146) 
Panel C: Ever received an associate degree by… 
2 years after high school completion -0.0217*** (0.00396)  -0.0181*** (0.00468) 
3 years after high school completion -0.0730*** (0.00642)  -0.0599*** (0.00715) 
4 years after high school completion -0.109*** (0.00836)  -0.0909*** (0.00975) 
5 years after high school completion -0.126*** (0.00972)  -0.105*** (0.0118) 
6 years after high school completion -0.140*** (0.0105)  -0.114*** (0.0130) 
7 years after high school completion -0.140*** (0.0113)  -0.108*** (0.0141) 
8 years after high school completion -0.139*** (0.0118)  -0.108*** (0.0148) 
9 years after high school completion -0.143*** (0.0122)  -0.109*** (0.0153) 
10 years after high school completion -0.141*** (0.0126)  -0.106*** (0.0158) 
11 years after high school completion -0.137*** (0.0129)  -0.102*** (0.0162) 
12 years after high school completion -0.130*** (0.0132)  -0.0926*** (0.0165) 
13 years after high school completion -0.129*** (0.0134)   -0.0843*** (0.0167) 





Effects of Delay on Labor Market Outcomes by Year, Restricted to “Thick Support” Sample 
  OLS  PSM 
Outcomes Coefficient SE  Coefficient SE 
Panel A: Income (adjusted $2010) 
1st year after high school completion 2,309*** (277.1)  2,601*** (345.8) 
2nd year after high school completion 2,462*** (344.9)  2,900*** (424.0) 
3rd year after high school completion 1,443*** (416.3)  2,232*** (499.6) 
4th year after high school completion -9.650 (458.6)  825.1 (553.0) 
5th year after high school completion -1,507*** (504.1)  -789.4 (623.1) 
6th year after high school completion -3,131*** (544.0)  -3,183*** (677.6) 
7th year after high school completion -4,933*** (580.1)  -4,965*** (724.0) 
8th year after high school completion -6,116*** (638.7)  -6,003*** (798.3) 
9th year after high school completion -6,266*** (678.4)  -6,051*** (836.9) 
10th year after high school completion -7,285*** (729.0)  -7,676*** (886.8) 
11th year after high school completion -7,864*** (783.7)  -8,853*** (953.4) 
12th year after high school completion -8,224*** (835.2)  -9,272*** (1,011) 
13th year after high school completion -8,596*** (917.3)  -9,639*** (1,113) 
Panel B: Total work hours 
1st year after high school completion 223.4*** (22.50)  218.9*** (28.44) 
2nd year after high school completion 223.5*** (26.46)  226.2*** (33.13) 
3rd year after high school completion 131.7*** (28.34)  137.6*** (34.16) 
4th year after high school completion 112.9*** (29.62)  160.8*** (36.18) 
5th year after high school completion -26.94 (29.78)  4.979 (36.62) 
6th year after high school completion -112.1*** (29.70)  -99.31*** (36.97) 
7th year after high school completion -212.7*** (30.58)  -177.7*** (38.11) 
8th year after high school completion -259.1*** (30.77)  -235.7*** (38.04) 
9th year after high school completion -259.0*** (30.76)  -269.3*** (38.31) 
10th year after high school completion -257.7*** (31.92)  -242.0*** (39.45) 
11th year after high school completion -250.6*** (32.30)  -261.1*** (39.80) 
12th year after high school completion -229.9*** (33.30)  -281.4*** (40.11) 
13th year after high school completion -237.0*** (33.91)  -275.8*** (42.06) 
Panel C: Full-time work status (> 35 hours/week for 50 weeks) 
1st year after high school completion 0.0605*** (0.00906)  0.0669*** (0.0115) 
2nd year after high school completion 0.0823*** (0.0114)  0.0923*** (0.0148) 
3rd year after high school completion 0.0622*** (0.0126)  0.0604*** (0.0162) 
4th year after high school completion 0.0710*** (0.0132)  0.0814*** (0.0169) 
5th year after high school completion 0.0412*** (0.0136)  0.0530*** (0.0172) 
6th year after high school completion -0.0216 (0.0140)  -0.0178 (0.0177) 
7th year after high school completion -0.0742*** (0.0144)  -0.0521*** (0.0181) 
8th year after high school completion -0.0805*** (0.0144)  -0.0679*** (0.0181) 
9th year after high school completion -0.105*** (0.0145)  -0.0981*** (0.0181) 
10th year after high school completion -0.0897*** (0.0145)  -0.0744*** (0.0182) 
11th year after high school completion -0.0943*** (0.0146)  -0.0843*** (0.0182) 
12th year after high school completion -0.0803*** (0.0142)  -0.0927*** (0.0178) 
13th year after high school completion -0.0726*** (0.0135)   -0.0822*** (0.0169) 
Note. NLSY97 follow-up surveys were not conducted annually after 2011. We imputed the labor market outcomes for 2012 and 
2014 by averaging the outcomes from the years immediately before and after.  




Sensitivity to Unobservable Selection, 𝛅 for 𝛃 = 𝟎 
  Panel A: College enrollment 
  
 Ever enrolled in 
college by… 
 Ever enrolled in a 
four-year college by… 
 Ever enrolled in a  
two-year college by… 
1 year after high school completion 1.33 10.34 2.20 
2 years after high school completion 1.66 7.69 1.73 
3 years after high school completion 1.83 6.52 1.63 
4 years after high school completion 1.89 5.45 1.59 
5 years after high school completion 2.05 4.95 1.56 
6 years after high school completion 2.23 5.01 1.48 
7 years after high school completion 2.25 4.94 1.48 
8 years after high school completion 2.33 4.78 1.45 
9 years after high school completion 2.43 4.73 1.49 
10 years after high school completion 2.50 4.67 1.50 
11 years after high school completion 2.51 4.53 1.46 
12 years after high school completion 2.59 4.56 1.47 
13 years after high school completion 2.65 4.70 1.47 
 Panel B: College completion 
  
Ever received a 
college degree 
by… 
Ever received a 
bachelor’s degree 
by… 
Ever received an  
associate degree by… 
2 years after high school completion -3.32  -3.24 
3 years after high school completion 5.25  3.85 
4 years after high school completion 4.46 12.37 2.44 
5 years after high school completion 3.07 8.93 0.87 
6 years after high school completion 3.43 9.24 0.97 
7 years after high school completion 3.71 7.29 0.95 
8 years after high school completion 3.87 6.19 0.95 
9 years after high school completion 3.24 5.04 0.86 
10 years after high school completion 3.13 4.69 0.94 
11 years after high school completion 3.44 4.71 0.87 
12 years after high school completion 3.42 4.80 0.83 
13 years after high school completion 3.59 4.54 0.93 
 Panel C: Employment outcomes 
  




Full-time work status  
(> 35 hours/week for 50 weeks) 
1 year after high school completion 1.85 1.39 0.54 
2 years after high school completion 2.79 1.09 1.31 
3 years after high school completion 0.59 0.78 0.91 
4 years after high school completion -0.65 0.37 0.58 
5 years after high school completion -3.25 -0.39 0.69 
6 years after high school completion -6.21 -4.01 -0.45 
7 years after high school completion -8.02 2.30 -14.88 
8 years after high school completion -6.20 5.85 1.45 
9 years after high school completion -6.10 -18.77 1.08 
10 years after high school completion -24.62 18.06 2.14 
11 years after high school completion -31.81 -19.39 1.66 
12 years after high school completion -7.38 -2.84 0.95 
13 years after high school completion -4.23 -2.11 1.23 
 
